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ABSTRACT
Despite the depth and breadth of U.S. credit markets, low- and moderateincome communities and minority borrowers have not historically enjoyed full
access to credit. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted to
help overcome barriers to credit for low- and moderate-income communities,
and minority borrowers. Scholars have long leveled numerous critiques
against CRA as unnecessary, ineffectual, costly, and lawless. But I argue,
using recent empirical evidence, that CRA has enhanced access to credit for
low-income, moderate-income, and minority borrowers at relatively low cost.
I contend that market failures and discrimination exacerbate credit problems in
low-income and minority communities and justify CRA. Critics argue that if
such problems exist, there are better alternatives to CRA. By contrast, I argue
that CRA should not be abandoned in favor of existing alternatives, such as the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Home
Owner’s Equity Protection Act, and government subsidies, and that CRA
compares favorably with other alternative forms of regulation and subsidies
that could be deployed. In sum, contrary to previous legal scholarship, I
demonstrate using recent empirical evidence that CRA has been successful in
expanding access to credit for low-income, moderate-income, and minority
households at a reasonable cost. I also suggest further enhancements to CRA
designed to respond to valid critiques and to build on its past successes.
© 2004 Michael S. Barr
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CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS:
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND ITS CRITICS
Michael S. Barr
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the depth and breadth of U.S. credit markets, low- and moderateincome communities, as well as minority borrowers, have not enjoyed full
access to those markets. Community advocates have long argued that
“redlining”—a practice of not lending to borrowers in neighborhoods with
higher concentration of minority households—has, at least historically, limited
the flow of capital from depository institutions for homeownership in minority
communities. Enormous progress has been made in expanding access to home
mortgage lending,1 but there is evidence that minority borrowers still face
discrimination. Others have argued that low-income communities generally
have lower access to capital than they would in a fully functioning market
because of market failures in addition to discrimination. For example,
information externalities and collective action problems may have impeded
credit markets in low-income communities.2 More recently, as capital from
“subprime”3 and other lenders has increased in low-income areas, consumer
advocates have argued that the increased flows of credit have in some cases
been accompanied by “predatory” or abusive lending practices targeted at
minorities, the elderly, and other segments of the population.
In response to these and other concerns, Congress has enacted a wide range
of federal laws and subsidy programs that affect the provision of credit.4 This
article focuses on perhaps the most controversial of these laws: the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA).5 Passed in response to concerns about
redlining of minority and low-income areas,6 and market failures in low1

This article focuses on home mortgage lending. Home mortgage lending is an important
aspect of financial security for low- and moderate-income borrowers, has attracted the greatest
attention in the literature, and has different market and regulatory features from other forms of
credit. I take up issues of short-term consumer debt and transactional financial services in
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004).
2
See infra Part III.
3
The label “subprime” refers to the status of borrowers who pay higher interest rates at least in
part because they are thought to have credit histories below the quality of prime borrowers.
Subprime lenders are lenders who specialize in lending to such borrowers. For a more
thorough discussion, see infra Part III.
4
See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, Focusing on Fannie and Freddie: The Dilemmas of Reforming
Housing Finance, 23 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 43 (2003). I take up the broader topic of different
modes of credit market regulation in a work in progress, Democratizing Access to Capital.
5
29 U.S.C. §§ 2901, 2902, 2903, 2906 (2000); 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(b)(3) (2000) (CRA
requirement for interstate mergers); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1831y (CRA Sunshine
Requirements); Id. § 1843(l)(2) (2000) (CRA requirement for financial subsidiaries engaging
in expanded financial activities).
6
See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 17, 604 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (“[CRA] is intended
to eliminate the practice of redlining by lending institutions.”). In its structure, CRA focuses
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income communities,7 CRA encourages federally insured banks and thrifts to
meet the credit needs of the entire communities that they serve, including lowand moderate-income areas, consistent with safe and sound banking practices.8
Federal banking agencies examine banks and thrifts periodically on their CRA
performance and rate the institutions. Regulators consider a bank’s or thrift’s
CRA record in determining whether to approve that institution’s application
for a deposit facility, which encompasses mergers with or acquisitions of other
depository institutions. Such applications also provide the public with an
opportunity to comment on the CRA performance of the institution.
CRA has strengthened over time, particularly during the 1990s, because of
both legal and market developments.9 Legislative changes to CRA enacted in
1989 required regulators to disclose publicly the institution’s rating and
performance evaluation.10 Also in 1989, a bank regulator denied for the first
time, on CRA grounds, an application for merger.11 Changes to the regulations
implementing CRA issued in 199512 focus CRA evaluations more on objective
performance measures rather than more subjective and process-oriented factors
that regulators had previously used and that scholars, banks, and community
organizations had often criticized. These new regulations require banks and
thrifts to disclose information about their small-business, small-farm, and
community-development lending. Under the 1995 regulations, large banks,
small banks, and wholesale or limited-purpose institutions have tailored
examinations. Large banks are evaluated on a three-part test of their lending,
investments, and services. Institutions are rated under four categories:
outstanding, satisfactory, needs to improve, and substantial noncompliance.
These legislative and regulatory changes occurred during a time of
increasingly intense consolidation in the banking industry, providing greater
opportunities for community organizations and regulators to evaluate bank and
thrift performance under CRA in the context of merger applications. With the
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley “Financial Modernization” Act of 1999,13
CRA was again strengthened. Banks and thrifts must have a satisfactory CRA

on market failures, rather than on discrimination per se, but as I discuss in Parts III & IV,
market failures and discrimination are intertwined.
7
For the theories underlying CRA, see infra Part III.
8
29 U.S.C. §§ 2901.
9
See, e.g., the discussions with lenders and community organizations described in ERIC S.
BELSKY ET AL., INSIGHTS INTO THE PRACTICE OF COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT LENDING,
A SYNTHESIS OF CRA DISCUSSION GROUPS (Joint Center on Housing, Harvard U., Working
Paper CRA00-1, 2000), at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/
cra001.pdf. I discuss CRA’s effectiveness in further detail infra, Part IV.
10
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183 (1989).
11
Continental Bank Corporation, 75 FED. RESERVE BULL. 304 (1989).
12
12 C.F.R. 228.41 et seq. (2004).
13
Pub. L. No. 106-102 (1999).
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record if they, or their holding companies, are to engage in newly authorized
financial activities, such as certain insurance and securities functions.14
CRA has been since its enactment, and remains today,15 the subject of
extensive debate. For example, in July 2004, two of the four federal banking
regulators pulled out of a joint CRA rulemaking process. The Office of Thrift
Supervision made a unilateral announcement that it was going to curtail CRA
examinations for nearly 90 percent of institutions that it regulates, those
holding less than $1 billion in assets, and all indications are that the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation will soon follow suit.16 If the two agencies
follow through, their plans would seriously undermine community
development in a vast number of low-income communities. The Federal
Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have balked
at this move, and Congress is debating whether and how to intervene.17
Legal scholars question vigorously the theoretical and empirical claims that
motivated CRA, and many advocate eliminating the policy.18 A large body of
literature suggests that competition in credit markets has driven (or will drive)
out discriminatory19 or abusive practices, and that market failures are
illusory.20 Critics of CRA argue that CRA is trying to address a nonexistent
problem. Moreover, they argue that problems in credit markets are insufficient
to justify intervention, and that even if intervention is warranted, CRA is the
wrong policy to pursue. Earlier legal scholarship suggested that CRA was
14

12 U.S.C. § 2903(c) (2000); Id. §1843(l)(2) (2000).
See, e.g., Michelle Heller, Reg Relief? Senator Puts Everything on the Table, AM. BANKER,
June 10, 2004, at 1 (noting that CRA is high on Senate Banking Committee list for regulatory
relief).
16
Michelle Heller, FDIC Seen Siding with OTS on CRA, AM. BANKER, July 20, 2004, at 1.
17
Id. I discuss these developments further in Part VII.
18
See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris et al., Housing-Finance Intervention and Private Incentives:
Helping Minorities and the Poor, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 634 (1994); Jeffery W.
Gunther, Should CRA Stand for "Community Redundancy Act"?, 23 REG. 56 (2000); Keith N.
Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities: Market and Regulatory Obstacles to Development Lending,
17 YALE J. ON REG. 197 (2000); Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community
Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1561 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291 (1993); Craig E. Marcus, Beyond the
Boundaries of the Community Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a
Market-Based Framework for Generating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 710 (1996); Peter P. Swire, Equality of Opportunity and Investment in Creditworthiness,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1533 (1995) [hereinafer Swire, Equality of Opportunity]; Peter P. Swire,
Safe Harbors and A Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV.
349 (1993) [hereinafter Swire, Safe Harbors]; Lawrence J. White, The Community
Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
281 (1993). Criticisms of CRA are discussed in detail in Part II.
19
This view is usually derived from Kenneth Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in
DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3 (Orley Ashenfelter and Albert Rees eds., 1973), and
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
20
See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lacker, Neighborhoods and Banking, 81 ECONOMIC QUARTERLY 13
(1995).
15
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having little, if any, positive effect, and at a high cost. For example, Jonathan
Macey and Geoffrey Miller attempted to demonstrate the weak foundations
and high cost of CRA in the wake of the 1989 reforms, charging that CRA
undermines the safety and soundness of the banking system, and empowers
community group rent-seeking at the expense of bank profitability.21
This Article systematically rebuts prior criticisms of CRA and lays a solid
theoretical and empirical foundation for the Act. The Article first establishes
the theoretical and empirical case for the persistence of credit market
imperfections and discrimination. Of course, at the most basic level, no market
is perfect.22 This Article explores why such market imperfections might be
relatively greater in low-income communities, or more appropriate as targets of
government intervention, given the social benefits of expanded access to
capital.23 The Article argues that market failures and discrimination do
warrant CRA in particular as a governmental policy.
The Article deploys recent empirical analysis to re-evaluate and ultimately
refute (or at least cast doubt on) many of the critics’ claims about the costs and
benefits of CRA. Such evidence shows that CRA appears to have created far
greater benefits than previously contended in the legal scholarship. Earlier
articles suggested that the costs of CRA were exceedingly high; this article
argues that, although some costs incurred are unnecessary, such costs have
been overstated. In addition, this Article argues that some of the costs
incurred, for example, those caused by the lack of bright line rules under CRA,
also represent benefits, previously ignored, in the form of increased citizen
participation and local, contextual “rulemaking.” In sum, I contend that CRA
has a reasonable foundation,24 and that it can be defended as socially efficient,
in the sense that the benefits of CRA likely far exceed the private costs.25
Some critics argue that CRA should be eliminated in favor of other
regulatory steps taken to improve access to capital in low- and moderate21

See Macey & Miller, supra note 18.
The existence of transaction costs, for example, implies that markets are not perfect. Cf.
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
23
For discussion of circumstances disfavoring government intervention to correct market
failures, see, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 8-10 (3d ed. 2000).
24
See infra Parts III-IV.
25
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is achieved when the benefits of a policy exceed its costs,
regardless of whether winners in fact compensate losers for their costs. N. Kaldor, Welfare
Propositions of Economics and Inter-personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939);
J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939). Pareto efficiency
is achieved when no one is made worse off by a transaction. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The
Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991) (criticizing use
of the Pareto principle); see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 31-32 (1994).
I take up distributional arguments for CRA in Part VI. For the argument that social welfare
needs to include distributional consequences, see John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18
ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950). See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); but see
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax
in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 667 (1994) (arguing that distributional issues
should not be addressed by legal rules).
22
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income areas, such as targeted subsidies or fair lending laws. By contrast, I
argue that CRA seems particularly effective when compared with other types
of existing credit market regulation. I also analyze CRA compared with other
modes of regulation and subsidy that CRA’s critics contend should be pursued
instead of CRA, if governmental intervention should occur at all. I show that
tax and transfer systems, different forms of subsidy, and rules backed by fines
all suffer from deficiencies that make them problematic as alternatives to CRA.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II recounts the scholarly critiques of
CRA. Part III elaborates the theories of market failure and discrimination that
rebut the theoretical critique and establish the need for CRA. Part IV analyzes
the recent empirical evidence regarding the costs and benefits of CRA and
argues that the case for CRA is strong. Given that critics often contend that
CRA should be abandoned in favor of other alternatives, Part V analyzes CRA
in the context of other existing home mortgage credit market policies, and Part
VI compares CRA to other alternative models of regulation and subsidy. Part
VII suggests policyreform s. Part VIII then concludes.
II. CRITIQUES OF CRA
The Community Reinvestment Act has been widely criticized.26 This Part
summarizes the key arguments against CRA. These may be grouped into five
main critiques: CRA constitutes poor regulatory design with high costs and
contradictory goals. Arbitrary enforcement of CRA presents opportunities for
rent-seeking by community organizations and regulators, who subvert CRA for
private purposes. CRA distorts the market and impedes financial market
efficiency. CRA provides little benefit for low-income communities. Lastly,
there are better alternatives to CRA. After laying out these arguments in detail
in this Part, the remaining Parts look at the available evidence and actual
regulatory and market practices to assess these contentions.
First, critics charge that the CRA statute is vague, blunt, and contradictory.
CRA’s goals, such as they may be adduced, have been criticized as selfcontradictory or out-dated. CRA expects banks to expand credit to households
to whom they would not otherwise lend but maintain safety and soundness,
which critics deride as mutually inconsistent.27 The Act does not make explicit
whether it is targeted at discrimination,28 or explain whether low-income
communities or individuals are to be helped. CRA may be designed to address
market failures, to combat discrimination, to achieve redistributive goals, or
perhaps to advance an old-fashioned notion of “local” depositors’ funds being
lent locally (an ideal now irrelevant in global credit markets).29
Opponents of CRA argue that these mushy, overlapping goals lead to
mushy, inconsistent regulation and that all these goals conflict with bank safety
26

See, e.g., sources cited supra, note 18.
See Gunther, supra note 18, at 56; Hylton, supra note 18, at 197, 238.
28
See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 637.
29
See Klausner, supra note 18, at 1561-64; Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 366.
27
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and soundness regulation. To the extent that CRA forces banks to lend locally,
CRA undermines the ability of banks to diversify their lending geographically,
undermining the soundness of their portfolio.30 To the extent that CRA forces
banks to lend to less creditworthy borrowers, CRA increases the risk of the
bank’s lending. Moreover, critics charge, in economic downturns, when banks
must necessarily reduce their risk profiles, CRA examiners would give them
bad ratings just for prudent reductions in risk.31
Opponents charge that CRA distorts the market in a manner that
undermines the banking system. They dispute the existence of market failures
and argue that CRA forces banks to engage in unprofitable, risky lending.32 It
deters efficiency-enhancing mergers33 and cost reductions through closures of
low-return bank branches. Critics deny that one can justify CRA as a quid pro
quo for a net subsidy from the federal government to banks. Even if a net
subsidy exists (which some commentators doubt34), critics say the appropriate
response would be to eliminate the distortion directly, not enact CRA.35
Critics also contend that CRA distorts the market in a way that actually
hurts low-income communities. Opponents argue that banks can avoid their
vague CRA obligations by moving out or staying out of low-income and
minority neighborhoods so that their “assessment” area for lending excludes
such communities.36 Defining communities by the geographical “accident” of
deposit facilities, they argue, is itself a difficult process with perverse effects
on bank locational decisions.37 They argue that CRA creates incentives to
avoid branches in poor neighborhoods in the first place, in order to avoid
having to comply with CRA by lending in those communities.38 Requiring
banks to lend wherever they take deposits is bad economics, critics allege,
because it undermines innovation, specialization and scale economies. In their
view, CRA impedes specialization because it requires banks to invest in
learning about all their communities, rather than permitting banks to invest the
high fixed costs of such knowledge in one area.39 CRA thwarts innovation
because it requires a high level of lending once an initial investment in
branches in a poor area is made. CRA undermines the ability of banks to

30

See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 324.
See Gunther, supra note 18, at 60.
32
See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 654; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1578; Macey &
Miller, supra note 18, at 295; White, supra note 18, at 282.
33
See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 322-23.
34
See, e.g., Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and
Implications for Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 3 (1999).
35
See, e.g., Macey and Miller, supra note 18.
36
See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 296, 340; White, supra note 18, at 287.
37
See Klausner, supra note 18, at 1584.
38
See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 296; Hylton, supra note 18, at 238.
39
See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 655; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1574; Swire, Safe
Harbors, supra note 18, at 355.
31
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benefit from scale economies40 and to internalize the positive externalities of
their lending because it requires many institutions to lend in the community.41
Thus, critics contend that CRA has provided little benefit. They argue that
economic growth, bank deregulation, technological innovation and competition
would have driven banks to lend in low-income areas even without CRA.42
Headline-getting loan commitments are a public relations boon but simply
represent what the banks would do anyway.43 They further argue that any
benefit that does accrue to low-income communities is effectively an
unwarranted cost to lenders, since any lending induced under CRA would
necessarily be less profitable and more risky to undertake. Others contend that
city renewal policies and community development financial institutions were
responsible for increased lending.44 Critics contend that lending not covered
by CRA and lending by banks and thrifts outside their CRA assessment areas
spurred the lending increases in low-income areas, so CRA could not have
been responsible for any increased lending in these communities.45
Critics argue that CRA gives regulators unfettered discretion that they
wrongly use to benefit some interest groups over others. For example, Macey
and Miller decry the manner in which CRA empowers activist pressure groups,
who, they allege, engage in rampant rent-seeking by holding banks hostage to
give the groups funds for their own purposes.46 Others charge that inner-city
developers gain advantage from the regulation.47 One scholar contends that,
presumably because of scale economies and the commodification of mortgage
markets, large banks benefit from CRA relative to small banks so that they
impede any changes to CRA.48 Critics further posit that the bank agencies
themselves are major beneficiaries of CRA because it gives them a lever to use
against banks in mergers they are concerned about for other reasons or allows
them to pursue political goals unrelated to CRA.49 According to this view, the
power of interest groups and regulators under CRA leads banks to engage in
CRA compliance in a way that does not actually help low-income or minority
communities. Banks, motivated by the desire to satisfy pressure groups and
regulators, engage in wasteful spending on public relations and headlinemaking loan commitments,50 and spend inordinate hours and dollars on
compliance and generation of data reporting and other wasteful paperwork.51
40

See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 652, 655; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1574-75.
See Gunther, supra note 18, at 58; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1577; cf. White, supra note
18, at 285.
42
See Gunther, supra note 18, at 56; Hylton, supra note 18, at 205.
43
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
44
See Hylton, supra note 18, at 205.
45
See Gunther, supra note 18, at 58.
46
See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 333-37.
47
See Hylton, supra note 18, at 237.
48
See id. at 198.
49
See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 342.
50
See id. at 295, 330-33; see also Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 638.
51
See Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 361; White, supra note 18, at 283.
41
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CRA enforcement has been described as costly, arbitrary and
inconsistent,52 depending on the strength of local community groups,
competitive factors in the financial sector and the decisions of banks to merge,
and the whims of regulators. There is reported to be wide variation in
toughness of regulators, both among agencies, and within agencies by
geographic region.53 The costs of compliance are alleged to be extraordinarily
high,54 and scholarship suggested that the 1995 regulatory reform did not
reduce compliance costs or enhance shareholder value.55
CRA has been described as overly blunt because it does not differentiate
between originating and holding loans,56 or between wholesale and special
purpose banks and other commercial banks.57 Critics also say it fails to give
appropriate weight to innovation rather than numbers of loans made.58 Others
charge that CRA uses loan rejection rates as a measure of performance, when
this would punish banks for outreach into harder to serve communities,59 and
penalizes minority-owned banks that do not serve the community, when
regulators should understand that these banks serve important other purposes.60
Moreover, CRA is bad economics, in the critics’ view, because it places a
regulatory burden on one type of financial institution (banks and thrifts) while
letting comparable institutions (credit unions, independent finance companies)
and other financial market participants (insurance companies, securities firms)
off without any similar obligations.61 In this view, it is irrational to apply CRA
to banks and thrifts, but not to other financial companies, or, for that matter,
every participant in every market, including, say, packagers of frozen peas.
Finally, critics argue that if one wants to achieve CRA’s goals, superior
alternatives exist. They argue that if CRA is rooted in distributional goals,
these can best be met through the tax and transfer system, rather than legal
rules.62 Others argue for in-kind demand-side subsidies, supply-side subsidies,
or tax incentives.63 Others urge enforcement of existing anti-discrimination
52

See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 637; Hylton, supra note 18, at 203; Macey & Miller,
supra note 18, at 295; Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 362.
53
See KENNETH H. THOMAS, THE CRA HANDBOOK (1998).
54
See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 641; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1590; Macey &
Miller, supra note 18, at 295.
55
See David B. Ely & Kenneth J. Robinson, Is the Community Reinvestment Act in need of
Further Reform? Evidence from Equity markets during the 1995 Reform Process, J. FIN.
SERVICES RES., Feb. 2003.
56
See Klausner, supra note 18, at 1587.
57
See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 315-316.
58
The 1995 CRA regulations take account of this critique. See infra, Part VII.
59
See Hylton, supra note 18, at 233.
60
See id. at 238; Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 296, 340-41.
61
See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 655; Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 312-13;
White, supra note 18, at 287-90.
62
Cf. Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 368 (responding to tax and transfer system as an
alternative to CRA).
63
Cf. Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 368 (describing the subsidy alternative).
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law.64 Some contend that the market solution—in particular, the growth of the
subprime mortgage market—answers any concerns about underserved lowincome communities.65 Other scholars call for an increased focus on
community development banks and peer-lending based on ethnic
communities.66 Within the framework of CRA, some scholars call for
tradeable CRA obligations akin to those used in environmental regimes,67
while others call for safe harbors under CRA for the top bank performers.68
In sum, critics contend that CRA suffers from poor design, forces banks
and thrifts to make unsound loans, impedes the efficiency of the financial
services sector, promotes rent seeking, imposes high compliance costs with
burdensome reporting requirements and regulatory uncertainty, does little
good, and therefore should be eliminated. Some of these arguments have
strong theoretical force. Market failures are difficult to establish empirically,
and “[t]he existence of important credit market failures is uncertain.”69
Moreover, it is unclear whether financial institutions will respond to incentives
in desired ways. The regulatory discretion embedded in CRA could create
agency problems and increase regulatory costs. Moreover, incentives are
targeted to some, but not all, financial intermediaries, so the incentives may
simply shift the composition of lending and not expand it or change its terms.70
This debate cannot be decided in the abstract, nor on the basis of anecdotal
evidence. I evaluate these criticisms of CRA in Parts III and IV. Part III
explains the theoretical justification for CRA, while Part IV assesses the
criticisms in light of recent empirical evidence that takes account of regulatory
changes and market experience during the 1990s. I demonstrate that CRA has
considerable benefits and much lower costs than previously suggested, and that
other policy criticisms of CRA are misguided. Parts V and VI address critics’
remaining arguments, discussed above, that existing or potential alternatives
are preferable to CRA. I show that CRA compares favorably with these
alternatives on many dimensions. In conclusion, I contend that CRA’s critics
have it wrong. On balance, CRA should be supported.

III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRA
64
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Significance of Credit Rationing, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1047 (1992)). But see Mitchell A.
Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Effect of Creditor Competition on Firm-Creditor
Relationships, 110 Q.J. ECON 407 (1995) (finding empirical support for credit constraints).
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The theoretical support for CRA derives from three bases. First, CRA
addresses market failures from imperfect information, collective action
problems, agency costs, and neighborhood externalities that are more acute in
low-income neighborhoods and for low-income borrowers than in credit
markets generally. Second, CRA helps to reduce discrimination against
minority borrowers and communities. CRA was not designed to address racial
discrimination against individual borrowers directly, but the significant
correlation between race and income, and between race of homeowner and
racial composition and income of neighborhood, gives CRA leverage to
overcome barriers to credit faced by minority households. In some ways, this
leverage is greater than that of fair lending laws.71 Third, CRA could help to
break down inefficient barriers between the bifurcated prime and subprime
credit markets by enhancing competition between prime and subprime lenders
in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. CRA can help make the
subprime and prime markets more efficient by completing the market.
A.
MARKET FAILURE
Credit market imperfections impede lending in low- and moderate-income
communities. First, information externalities and asymmetries may lead to
credit rationing that excludes credit worthy borrowers and causes banks to
overlook profitable loans.72 Information externalities can produce credit
constraints because the efficiency of bank lending is in part a function of
“market thickness.”73
Second, collective action problems exacerbate
information externalities and inhibit entry into these communities.74 CRA
could help to mitigate these credit constraints by providing “an effective
commitment device to coordinate lending….”75 Third, agency costs make it
difficult to align corporate interest in profitable lending with the behavior of
loan agents, which CRA can help to address by providing additional incentives
to reform corporate structures. Lastly, neighborhood externalities provide
grounds for governmental intervention.76 I take up these points in turn.
Information externalities contribute to lower rates of lending in low-income
communities than would be socially optimal. Borrowers in low-income
neighborhoods find it more difficult to obtain mortgage loans in part because
lenders lack sufficient information on home sales in these thin markets, that is,

71
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markets with a relatively low level of economic activity.77 The small number
of transactions in a low-income community will make appraisals difficult.
Any one financial institution will not want to be the only participant in a
market with uncertain collateral values. The reduction in market participants
will further decrease the amount of information availableabout property values
and reduce the liquidity of other loans to that neighborhood. Lenders will not
want to lend in areas with low levels of liquidity. Property values will decline
as the market becomes less liquid, reinforcing the downward trend in lending.
The information required to offset this trend is costly. In low-income
communities, such information externalities are likely to be more costly to
overcome, and the benefits of overcoming them are likely to be smaller, than in
high-income neighborhoods.78 Creditors will face the up-front costs of
developing expertise in neighborhoods that they have not previously served,
and about which there is less information available from other creditors,
appraisers, and real estate professionals. In addition, creditors will need to
spread the fixed costs of finding information about low-income neighborhoods
over fewer transactions and smaller loan sizes.79 Creditors will have to train
their personnel to search for creditworthy borrowers and sound residential
neighborhoods in locations where lenders have not previously conducted a
large number of transactions. Such information creates positive externalities
that benefit all lenders. Information about collateral values and the existence
of creditworthy borrowers will likely—if lenders report credit histories—inure
to the benefit of all lenders. Thus, the lender that invested in the additional
information will not be fully compensated for its investment.
Lenders that do enter the market will charge higher prices to offset these
risks. Lenders may seek to internalize more of the benefits of customer
information by not reporting credit histories to the credit bureaus.80 By failing
to report credit histories, they gain market share, which would induce them to
spend more on information and lend more. Borrowers, however, will face
higher prices and will not be able to demonstrate to other lenders, including
prime lenders, that they are creditworthy. Moreover, the higher prices may
drive more borrowers out of the market or increase defaults, making it less
likely that other lenders will be willing to serve the market.
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In addition to neighborhood information externalities, asymmetries in
information between lenders and borrowers that are costly to overcome can
also lead to credit rationing. Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss have
demonstrated that credit rationing can occur when seemingly similar borrowers
differ in unobserved ways in their willingness and ability to repay.81 If lenders
charge higher interest rates to compensate themselves for the uncertainty
regarding the risk of a given pool of borrowers, they will face higher default
rates. Adverse selection would mean that riskier borrowers will take out loans
from the bank because they cannot get access to lower-priced loans elsewhere.
These riskier borrowers will tend to default more often because moral hazard
increases as interest rates increase, and because higher-priced loans will simply
be more difficult for low-income borrowers to repay. These incentives
increase the likelihood low-income borrowers will default even if they did not
present a similar risk of defaulting on a lower-cost loan.
It is costly to overcome information asymmetries regarding low-income
borrowers. These borrowers often lack credit histories, and may not even have
a bank account,82 so determining their creditworthinessis more difficult and
costly. Many low-income households could provide indicia that they are likely
to repay their loans, such as a strong record of paying rent and utilities on time,
but banks are not used to relying on such information. There is not yet a
clearinghouse or standardized method of determining creditworthiness on the
basis of these factors,83 making these other measures of creditworthinessmore
uncertain than the standard credit scores produced by the credit bureaus.
Additionally, low-income households often have lower levels of educational
attainment, and thus may require more assistance in completing loan
applications.84 Creditors might rationally choose not to spend the additional
sums necessary to lend to creditworthy borrowers in low-income communities.
Creditors considering whether to enter a low-income market also face
collective action problems. Information externalities and other factors may
delay some lenders’ entry into an otherwise profitable market, further
diminishing the economic prospects of the area and reinforcing other lenders’
decisions not to lend. Even if there are credit worthy borrowers and sufficient
collateral values, a lender might rationally avoid the risk of lending in an
uncertain market because other lenders are not lending there. One can
characterize this delayed entry as a collective action problem.85 By contrast, if
81
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lenders know that others will participate, their collateral is more likely to have
knowable values, their collateral and loans are more likely to be liquid, and
property values may be able to rise more quickly, all other things being equal.
The strength of other institutions in a community also reinforces
differential access to capital. For example, to the extent that higher-income
communities could, in theory, exhibit information externalities or collective
action problems, such failures are overcome by real estate developers and
agents (who gather and disseminate information about price and quality),
neighborhood associations (who enforce rules such as lawn maintenance that
bolster uniform reliability of collateral values), and the like. These institutions
are generally weaker or unavailable in low-income communities, and their
absence exacerbates market failures. CRA has helped to bolster these
community-based organizations in some communities, which in turn reinforces
the effectiveness of CRA in overcoming market failures.
Neighborhood externalities that result from credit market failures also
undergird CRA.86 Neighborhoods with low access to credit see declines in
property values, increased vacant properties, and other indicia of distress.
Households find it more difficult to get credit if they live in distressed
neighborhoods. Lower access to credit can increase neglect of properties.87
Adjacent property owners may decide not to invest in maintenance or to move
out of the neighborhood.88 Conversely, increased access to credit and
homeownership can help to turn neighborhoods around, increasing property
values for adjacent properties and neighborhoods.89 Government policies
designed to increase homeownership can thus have positive externalities in
communities not directly affected by the government programs.90
B.
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
CRA was not enacted to address racial discrimination against particular
borrowers. That role was assigned to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of
1974 (ECOA).91 Yet CRA had its origins in claims that banks were
“redlining” borrowers living in low-income, minority communities, and CRA
has helped to open up mortgage markets for minority borrowers. Thus, in this
Section, I explore the theory and evidence regarding credit market
discrimination as a basis for CRA.92
86
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The standard view, derived from the work of Gary Becker, is that, in the
long run, in a perfect market, discrimination will disappear.93 Long- run
equilibrium will probably occur sooner in credit markets than in, say, labor
markets, because credit markets are more efficient. Nonetheless, at a given
point in time, one would need to specify the parameters of Becker’s model to
test his hypothesis, and competing theories suggest that the model is too
limited. Credit- rationing theory can explain the persistence of lending
discrimination. In addition, Becker’s model assumes that only racial animus is
illegal; however, statistical discrimination, in which lenders use factors
correlated with race as proxies for creditworthiness, violates ECOA.94 Lastly,
price discrimination can persist in segmented credit markets.
Credit rationing enables discrimination to persist even in competitive
markets. Credit rationing can occur because of asymmetric information,
adverse selection and moral hazard.95 If credit rationing occurs, identical
marginal applicants will be treated differently; some borrowers will get loans
while others will not, and lenders will not charge differential prices to sort
borrowers by risk. The single-price model in Stiglitz and Weiss accurately
describes the prime credit market dominated by banks and thrifts,96 while the
subprime market differentiates by risk. Since lenders in credit-rationing
models do not provide loans to all members of a class of identical loan
applicants, they could discriminate without losing profits (absent legal liability
under anti-discrimination laws). Moreover, tests of lending discrimination
But see Klausner, supra note 18, at 1563-64 (arguing that ECOA, not CRA, should address
racial discrimination). For a defense of the view that CRA should be seen as a legitimate
response to racial discrimination in addition to ECOA, see Part IV.
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based on profitability would not identify lending discrimination, because
lenders who discriminated would be just as profitable as lenders who did not.
Statistical discrimination could be profitable if race is correlated with an
aspect of creditworthiness that is costly to observe directly. It is rational for
financial institutions to avoid information costs by making statistical
assessments about creditworthiness, even if such factors are correlated with
race. Competitive markets will not drive out statistical discrimination in the
short term.97 Still, statistical discrimination will be less accurate than a direct
measure of individual creditworthiness. As technology and innovation drive
down the costs of obtaining such measures, one would expect statistical
discrimination to diminish in competitive markets over the long term.98
The evidence on discrimination in credit markets is hotly contested.99
Disparities in the rates at which whites and African Americans (among others)
are denied home mortgage loans continue to be large. But disparities alone do
not prove discrimination; the empirical debate revolves around controls for
creditworthiness and other factors that legitimately affect lending decisions.
The debate intensified with the release of the first Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) data containing race in 1991 and the publication of a study by
economists at the Federal Reserve Board of Boston in 1992.100 The Boston
Fed Study found that African Americans were nearly twice as likely as whites
to be denied home mortgage loans after adjusting for an array of variables
related to risk.101 The study has come under a barrage of attacks,102 but
rebuttals have affirmed the study’s central findings.103 On balance, the
evidence suggests that disparities between African-American and white
borrowers persist.104 Matched pair testing has also found differential
97
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treatment.105 These disparities suggest either disparate treatment of, or
disparate impact on, minorities.106 Studies of redlining on the basis of
neighborhood composition face greater empirical challenges and provide
inconclusive results. Two studies have found that largely African-American
census tracts received fewer loans than other tracts, after controlling for tract
characteristics, while one study suggests that there may be redlining on the
basis of income.107 In sum, recent analysis suggests that “extensive
underwriting discrimination existed in 1990, and there is no more recent
evidence to show that this discrimination has gone away.”108
In addition to discrimination in loan denials, price discrimination can also
occur because of market fragmentation.109 Prime lenders offer a single price to
borrowers who meet their criteria and ration credit among the others.
Subprime lenders offer differential pricing of loans on the basis of risk and
other factors. Although the growth of risk- based pricing in the subprime
market has broadened the eligible pool of borrowers,110 differentiated pricing
may also result in racial discrimination. Using credit scores, creditors can
determine the price at which they would be willing to lend to a particular
borrower, but the subprime market’s fragmented nature prevents all potential
borrowers from learning about lenders’ pricing schemes. This permits lenders
to distinguish among similar borrowers in pricing loans. Creditors price loans
based on factors other than risk, including a borrower’s willingness to pay.
Differential pricing can facilitate market clearing, but these pricing techniques
lead to systematically different prices for minorities than for whites.
Under ECOA, price discrimination is unlawful.111 Price discrimination
occurs in a range of credit markets.112 Comprehensive loan pricing data are
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not available for home mortgages.113 Studies have focused on “overages,” the
amount by which negotiated loan rates exceed the lender’s minimum rates set
forth on “rate sheets” for loan officers.114 Strikingly, mortgages obtained by
African Americans more often contain overages, and much higher ones, than
mortgages obtained by others.115 African Americans fare worse in negotiations
with mortgage brokers and loan officers.116
Other factors may reinforce discrimination. Automatic credit systems can
have a disparate impact on minorities if the factors used are correlated with
race, and allow disparate treatment if brokers treat borderline cases differently.
Firms adopt reward structures for loan officers that favor high-income areas,
with higher concentrations of white borrowers. Loan officers or brokers may
discriminate but their practices might go undetected by creditors because of
agency problems.117 Banks may underinvest (from a social perspective) in
branches or in training loan officers in how to make loans in underserved,
minority neighborhoods. Credit discrimination might lead minorities to
underinvest in creditworthiness, diminishing their prospects for a loan.118
Discrimination in the housing market119 or the labor market may be transmitted
to credit markets. Differences in the collateral values of homes or fears of
racial integration could depress housing prices, leading to lower sales, fewer
loans, and higher interest rates in minority neighborhoods.
C.
113
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Banks and thrifts have increased their lending to low- and moderateincome borrowers in ways that suggest that CRA is working.120 But subprime
lending—a sector outside CRA’s purview—has grown dramatically at the
same time.121 Subprime lenders specialize in making loans to borrowers with
impaired or limited credit history. Most subprime loans are refinance loans.
Although refinancing may be used to obtain better rates, subprime refinance
loans are usually used for home improvement or consumer purchases, to pay
for education expenses, or to consolidate other consumer debt.122 With new
sources of funding available from the secondary market, and advances in
information and risk management, subprime lending has grown sevenfold from
1994 to 2002, reaching $241 billion, or 9 percent of the market.123 In 2001,
there were nearly 200 subprime and manufactured home lenders.124
The subprime market is plagued by serious problems. Some subprime
borrowers who could have qualified for loans from prime lenders end up in the
subprime market, paying higher rates. Research suggests that between 10 and
35 percent of subprime borrowers could qualify for prime mortgage loans.125
Some minority borrowers may have been improperly “steered” to higher cost
lenders.126 Moreover, studies have documented abusive practices in the
subprime sector.127 These practices have included “flipping,” repeatedly
refinancing a loan in a short period of time. Flipping subjects a borrower to
high fees, including prepayment penalties, which diminish the borrower’s
home equity without providing significant benefit. Loans have been “packed”
with additional products (such as credit life insurance) without the borrower
understanding that the products were optional or unsuitable. Loans have
included fees unrelated to risk or servicing, and which are structured to
disguise their true costs. Some brokers have made home mortgage loans
without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay. These so-called “asset
based” loans were often made by brokers who earned high fees and were less
120
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concerned about their reputations among lenders. In other cases, “unscrupulous
mortgage brokers, lenders, home improvement contractors, appraisers, and
combinations thereof” engaged in “outright fraud” as well as “deceptive or
high-pressure sales tactics,” and often “prey[ed] on . . . the elderly, minorities,
and individuals with lower incomes and less education . . . .”128
While credit risk is a key determinant of whether a borrower receives a
prime or subprime loan, a recent study suggests that “credit risk alone may not
fully explain why borrowers end up in the subprime market.”129 For example,
borrowers who are older, Hispanic, or search less for interest rates are more
likely to end up in the subprime market.130 Having a subprime loan is an
important determinant of refinancing with a subprime loan even after
controlling for relevant factors: Sixty percent of subprime borrowers who
refinanced did so with subprime loans rather than prime ones,131 indicating that
subprime borrowers get stuck in the subprime market. Subprime borrowers are
more dissatisfied with the mortgage process than prime borrowers.132
The price that borrowers pay is a function not only of using a subprime
lender, but also of negotiating with mortgage brokers, who dominate the
subprime market. Brokers are compensated for getting borrowers to pay
higher rates than those for which the borrower would qualify. Such “yield
spread premiums” are widely used. In loans with yield spread premiums,
unlike other loans, there is wide dispersion in prices paid to mortgage brokers.
Within the group of borrowers paying yield spread premiums, African
Americans paid $474 more, and Hispanics $590 more, than white borrowers;
thus, even if minority and white borrowers could qualify for the same rate,
minority borrowers are likely to pay much more.133 Minority borrowers and
white borrowers tend to go to different lenders and “some lenders use
particularly aggressive rate-setting rules with minority customers.”134
Moreover, borrowers in the subprime market form a pool whose risk
characteristics are worse and more widely dispersed than borrowers in the
prime market.135 Even though there is rough risk-based pricing in the
subprime market, defaulting borrowers create an externality that raises interest
rates on all subprime borrowers. Regulation of the subprime sector is in part a
response to the problem of incomplete contracts. Borrowers cannot contract
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with one another to allocate the costs of the negative externality of default.
Foreclosures concentrated in low-income neighborhoods can also cause
negative externalities to neighboring property owners.136
Some critics believe that the subprime market’s growth obviates the need
for CRA, but I argue in Parts IV and V that CRA is uniquely positioned to
overcome the bifurcation between the prime and subprime markets by
enhancing competition from banks and thrifts. Overcoming that bifurcation
would improve market efficiency, reduce racial discrimination, and speed the
process of correcting other market failures. Lending by subprime specialists
does not replace lending by banks and thrifts. First, subprime creditors
specialize in refinance loans rather than in home purchase originations. That
is, subprime lenders free-ride on the information generated by firms engaged in
home purchase lending. Second, subprime lenders have failed to report credit
scores for sound borrowers in order to capture the informational benefits from
their investment. As a result, the positive externalities from increased lending
in low-income areas are not realized. Third, borrowing from a subprime lender
signals to prime lenders that a borrower is a bad credit risk. Rather than
increasing access to prime lending, subprime borrowing helps to keep
borrowers in the subprime market, where borrowers pay more for credit.
Moreover, minority households are much more likely to remain stuck in the
subprime market even after accounting for creditworthiness.
D.
SUMMARY
Market failures, racial discrimination, and bifurcated credit markets justify
CRA. CRA helps to overcome information externalities and collective action
problems by helping to coordinate bank lending. CRA responds to racial
discrimination by encouraging banks and thrifts to lend in low-income areas
and to low-income borrowers, where and among whom minorities are
disproportionately represented. CRA could offer a strong response to the
market failures that have arisen from bifurcated credit markets. In Part IV, I
explain how CRA is effectively overcoming many of these barriers.
IV. NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT CRA IS EFFECTIVE
Part III offered theoretical foundations for CRA. This Part explores recent
empirical evidence showing that CRA, on balance, constitutes defensible
policy. The first Section relies on empirical evidence, part of which I directed
at the Treasury Department, to demonstrate that CRA has a positive impact on
access to credit, despite the empirical difficulty of isolating CRA as a cause of
recent, positive developments in credit markets.137 The second Section
136
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analyzes how the costs of CRA are generally overstated. In particular, the
claim that CRA induces banks and thrifts to make dangerously unprofitable
loans is not substantiated by the data. Similarly, I present evidence to rebut
claims of rampant rent seeking and other costs. Even a rough sense of the
costs and benefits of CRA adduced thus far suggests that it is socially efficient.
The third Section shows how other arguments that CRA is the wrong policy
response miss the mark. Parts V and VI address the remaining arguments of
the critics that alternatives to CRA should be preferred.
A.
THE BENEFITS OF CRA ARE SUBSTANTIAL
Initiatives by financial institutions over the last decade suggest that CRA –
in combination with other factors – is helping banks and thrifts to eliminate or
reduce barriers to credit. With impetus from CRA, lenders have: formed
multi-bank Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and loan consortia
to reduce risk, overcome collective action problems, and share the costs and
benefits of developing information about low-income markets; invested in
locally based Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) to
develop specialized market knowledge, share risk, and explore new market
opportunities; engaged in special marketing programs to targeted communities;
experimented with more flexible underwriting and specialized servicing
techniques to determine if a broader range of applications could be approved
without undue risk; and funded credit counseling to improve the
creditworthiness of potential borrowers. Many larger institutions have
developed specialized units within their organizations that focus on the needs
of low- and moderate-income communities. A positive lending cycle has
begun in many communities: once lenders know that others will be making
loans to a community, they face less liquidity risk, gather and disseminate
information more quickly, and produce positive information externalities.
Experience suggests that increased lending to low-income communities has
occurred, and that such lending has not led to the kind or the extent of
unprofitable, excessively risky activity predicted by critics.
Studies have found evidence that CRA improved access to home mortgage
credit for low-income borrowers during the 1990s, as CRA enforcement
increased. One study found that the share of CRA-eligible loan originations by
banks, thrifts, and their affiliates in the 1990s increased; it also found evidence
of gains to minorities and low-income areas from alllenders , which the authors
attribute in part to increased fair lending enforcement.138 Other researchers
have found evidence consistent “with the view that the CRA has been effective
in encouraging bank organizations, particularly those involved in
consolidation, to serve [low- and moderate-income] and minority borrowers
and neighborhoods.”139 Lending to low- and moderate income borrowers grew
138
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much faster than lending to other groups in the 1990s, which may have been
attributable to both CRA and other factors.140 A case study found that one
lender had extended loans to low-income and minority borrowers with lower
credit scores than it normally required, at least in part because of CRA.141
Research that I directed at the Treasury Department found that, in absolute
terms, between 1993 and 1999, depository institutions covered by the CRA
and their affiliates made nearly $800 billion in home mortgage, small business,
and community development loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers
and communities.142 The number of CRA-eligible mortgage loans increased
by 39 percent between 1993 and 1998, while other loans increased by only 17
percent.143 Affiliates are included in CRA assessments only at the lender’s
discretion. Even excluding all affiliates, banks and thrifts themselves
increased their lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas by
10 percent, compared with no growth at all for these lenders in their other
markets.144 Over this period, the portfolio share of CRA-covered lender and
affiliate loans going to these borrowers and areas increased from 25 to 28
percent as these institutions increasingly focused on underserved markets.145
Lenders covered by CRA primarily specialize in prime lending. In the
prime market, covered lenders and their affiliates increased their market share
of lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas from 66 percent
in 1993 to 71 percent in 1998.146 Yet the dramatic expansion of non-covered
lenders in the subprime refinance market meant that banks and thrifts lost
market share overall in low- and moderate-income communities. Fully 85
percent of non-covered institutions’ growth is attributable to lending by
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140
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specialists in subprime and manufactured home lending. More than 77 percent
of this subprime lending growth is attributable to refinances rather than home
purchase loans.147 As a result of the growth in subprime refinance lending,
non-covered institutions increased their overall market share of lending to lowand moderate-income borrowers and areas from 35 percent in 1993 to 37
percent in 1998.148 Thus, banks and thrifts increased their home purchase
lending, while others focused on subprime refinance loans.
HMDA data also show improvements in lending to minority and lowincome borrowers, although HMDA data need to be treated with caution.149
From 1993 to 1999, the number of home purchase loans made to Hispanics
increased 121.4 percent; to Native Americans, 118.9 percent; to blacks, 91.0%;
to Asians, 70.1 percent; and to whites, 33.5 percent. Over that period, the
number of home purchase loans extended to applicants with incomes less than
80 percent of the median increased 86.2 percent, much higher growth than any
other income group experienced. In 1999, conventional home purchase loans
extended in neighborhoods that are predominantly minority were up 17 percent
over the previous year, compared with 6 percent growth in other
neighborhoods.150
Without more evidence, however, one cannot attribute the rapid growth in
lending to low-income, moderate-income, and minority borrowers and areas to
CRA. A series of other factors undoubtedly contributed to these gains. First
and foremost, strong economic growth during the 1990s led to rapid income
growth and lower unemployment rates for minorities in many of the largest
central cities. Real interest rates for mortgages were at low levels during much
of this period. Second, financial and technological innovation helped drive
down the costs of assessing creditworthiness, offering mortgage products,
effectuating transactions, and funding loans through securitization. Third,
extensive consolidation in the financial services sector heightened the potential
to magnify the adverse consequences of poor performance under CRA on
major transactions., Consolidation also enhanced competition for the delivery
of credit in many markets, including low-income communities. Fourth, it is
difficult to disaggregate the effects of CRA, HMDA, ECOA, Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) lending, and the government-sponsored enterprise
(GSE) Affordable Housing Goals, which all operated in intensified ways on
different mortgage market participants during this period.
Controlling for the effects of these factors, however, the Treasury research
that I directed found that CRA provides important benefits. Evidence
benchmarking banks and thrifts against non-CRA lenders facing similar market
147
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and legal conditions (other than CRA) suggests that CRA is effective. The
report found that CRA lenders (with or without their affiliates) increased their
CRA-eligible home purchase lending faster than those not regulated by CRA
from 1993 to 1999.151 Similarly, analysis of CRA lending across metropolitan
areas with divergent economic circumstances and divergent levels of home
mortgage activity reinforces the view that CRA helps expand access to home
mortgage credit for low- and moderate-income borrowers.152 Case studies of
metropolitan areas also support that view.153 On these measures, CRA appears
to make a difference.154 Additional analysis of this data by authors of the
Treasury report—controlling for economic situation, demographics, housing
market, market organization, Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
insurance, secondary market sales, and other factors—found that “CRA has
increased the flow of credit to [low- and moderate-income] borrowers and
areas by CRA-covered lenders and their affiliates over the period studied.”155
The Joint Center on Housing at Harvard University followed up this
research by examining the behavior of CRA lenders, the portion of CRAeligible market share held by banks and thrifts, and price changes and turnover
rates in low-income neighborhoods.156 This research again found that CRA
has positive effects. The models used in the report do not “reveal[] with
precision the exact magnitude of the impact of CRA,”157 and so should be
interpreted cautiously. By one measure, however, the report found that the
effect of CRA on home mortgage lending to low- and moderate-income
borrowers and areas was equivalent to the effect of a 1.3 percentage point
decrease in unemployment.158 The report found:
CRA lenders have changed their behavior. CRA lenders originate
a higher proportion of CRA-eligible loans than they would if CRA did
not exist, and they seem to reject fewer CRA-eligible loan
applications than they would if CRA did not exist.
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CRA lenders appear to have captured a higher share of the CRAeligible lending market than they would have if CRA were not in
place.
CRA-eligible neighborhoods seem to have more rapid house price
increases and higher turnover rates than other neighborhoods, which
is consistent with an expansion of credit in those areas.159
In reaching these conclusions, the report used two key variables: one
measuring lending within as opposed to outside assessment areas, and one
denoting whether community groups had signed CRA agreements.160 Some
findings from the study are open to conflicting interpretations. On the one
hand, the growth of the subprime market may mean that CRA is less important
than it once was, or even undermine the suggestion that CRA has improved
lending by banks and thrifts, since the growth of subprime lending has been
much stronger. In addition, some portion of the increased lending by CRAcovered, prime lenders represented levels of lending that shifted from subprime
lenders to prime lenders, rather than a net increase in loans. Moreover, much
of the increase in lending that the Joint Center attributed to CRA came from
lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers in middle- and high-income
neighborhoods, with presumably lower neighborhood effects.
On the other hand, each of these points is amenable to a contrary and often
more plausible interpretation. The Joint Center’s approach may actually
understate the effect of CRA on changing banking practices both within and
outside assessment areas. Banks may change their business practices to meet
the credit needs of low-income communities, and then apply those changed
practices across all of the areas that they serve, low-income or not, and not
simply within their assessment areas. The costs of developing products and
training personnel may make consistently applying these business practices
across all lending areas more efficient. Moreover, if bank performance under
CRA has a demonstration effect on other lenders, and helps to thicken the
market, as information externality theory would predict, then the success of
CRA contributed to the relative growth in low- and moderate-income lending
by non-CRA regulated lenders. As the Joint Center report notes, the “fact that
many large independent mortgage companies (i.e., mortgage lenders not
subject to CRA) have been stunningly successful at serving the lower-income
market is highly suggestive that this dynamic has indeed played out and that a
reasonable portion of the CRA-eligible market is now being served
economically.”161
In addition, in the absence of CRA, banks and thrifts may not have
behaved the same as independent mortgage firms in lending to low- and
moderate-income borrowers, but worse, given their higher costs of funds and
159

Id. at 58.
Id. at 61.
161
Id. at 60.
160

Credit Where It Counts

27

business plans that tend to focus on higher cost services to higher income
clientele.162 Thus, comparisons between bank and nonbank lending to lowincome borrowers would tend to understate CRA’s impact on banks and thrifts.
Furthermore, a focus on CRA lending in low-income neighborhoods is too
narrow. CRA lending to low-income borrowers outside of poor neighborhoods
improves social mobility by helping low-income borrowers move to better
neighborhoods and is an important element of CRA’s success. In addition,
GSE affordable housing goals and fair lending laws likely increased lending by
nonbanks and banks, so it is difficult to measure what mortgage companies
would have done in the absence of these laws. Lastly, even if some gains in
prime lending merely represent a substitution of subprime lending for prime
lending, such shifts lower prices and move industry practice in low-income
neighborhoods towards the standards of the prime market, which provides
significant benefits to low- and moderate-income and minority households.
Thus, the evidence on home mortgage lending confirms that, at bottom:
CRA-regulated entities still lead the market in the provision of
mortgage capital to lower-income people and communities, especially
lower-income minorities. Detailed multivariate analysis confirms that
CRA-regulated lenders originate a higher proportion of loans to
lower-income people and communities than they would if CRA did
not exist. Moreover, lower-income neighborhoods targeted by CRA
appear to have more rapid price increases and higher property sales
rates than other neighborhoods.163
Evidence from small business markets also reinforces the view that CRA
has been effective. The 1995 changes to the CRA regulations required large
commercial banks and savings associations to report on small business lending
for the first time. In 2002, the most recent year for which data is available,
banks and thrifts subject to CRA’s small business reporting requirement made
$111 billion in loans to firms with revenues under $1 million, nearly double
the 1996 figure.164 Banks and thrifts made $27.8 billion in community
development loans in 2002, $10 billion more than they had made in 1996.165
A recent empirical study found that CRA “does increase lending to small
businesses as intended.”166 The study suggests that CRA increases the number
of firms that can access credit by four to six percentage points.167 The study
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found that CRA generally increased access to credit for small firms, as
intended by CRA, but did not find any evidence that CRA increased access to
credit for small firms located in low- and moderate-income areas, holding
other factors constant.168 Moreover, the study determined that the increased
lending to small businesses induced by CRA provided benefits to the real
economy—increased payrolls and reduced bankruptcies—without any
evidence that such lending crowded out other financing available to small
businesses or adversely affected bank profitability or loan performance.169 It is
somewhat remarkable that studies of CRA’s effect on small business lending
show any effect at all, given that small business data collection is relatively
new, data are not as comprehensive, and the examinations for small business
lending are not as well developed as for home mortgage lending.
Aside from lending activities, financial institutions have also increased
their community development investments in low-income communities under
CRA. Although comprehensive data on investments are not available, one can
assemble some broad aggregate statistics using data from other regulatory
provisions.170
For example, national bank community development
investments totaled $15 billion from 1965 to 2002, with well over half the
investments coming during the last decade.171 Such investments are in addition
to community development loans, which totaled $42.3 billion in 2003 alone.172
Changes in financial services industry may mean that CRA covers less and
less of the financial services world. Banks and thrifts’ share of financial assets
has declined dramatically since the end of World War Two, from 60 percent to
about 25 percent today. Moreover, for business organization reasons unrelated
to CRA, banks and thrifts may pursue a greater portion of their lending activity
through affiliates not covered by CRA, particularly mortgage finance company
affiliates. According to the Joint Center, the reach of CRA is likely declining:
In combination, the changing industry structure, along with the
fact that CRA expanded the capacity of all industry players to better
168
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serve lower-income borrowers, has diminished the extent that CRAregulated organizations now lead the market. Econometric analysis
suggests that on average over the period 1993 to 2000, CRA may
have increased the share of loans going to CRA-eligible borrowers by
2.1 percentage points (or from 30.3 to 32.4 percent). Estimates for
individual years suggest, however, that the CRA impact has declined
from 3.7 percentage points in 1993 to 1.6 percentage points in
2000.173
In part, this decline may be less momentous than community-based
organizations suggest: although assets subject to CRA are declining as a share
of financial assets, such assets continue to grow in absolute terms. Moreover,
as CRA-covered institutions develop new products, train employees, and alter
organizational structures to meet the credit needs of low-income communities,
such changes may have important influences on uncovered affiliates of banks
and thrifts. In addition, CRA enforcement through mergers and acquisitions
will continue to be important. Consolidation in the banking industry, after a
brief respite during the recession of 2001–2002, has picked up again, and longterm forecasts suggest that more will likely come.174 Furthermore, the GrammLeach-Bliley Act made expansion into new activities, such as insurance and
securities, contingent on banks’ CRA performance. Therefore banking
organizations will have to pay attention to their CRA performance for many
years to come, as they seek to enter new financial markets.
Admittedly, market and technological forces are tending to reinforce access
to some types of credit, particularly home mortgage loans that are now easily
commodified, as some critics of CRA have suggested. Nonetheless, market
pressures will also mean that financial intermediaries are under increasing
pressure to serve the highest end of the market. Increasingly, community
banks and thrifts, and community development financial institutions, may find
that a larger portion of the local market (in particular the market for small
business loans) is of less interest to larger banks and thrifts. This will open up
new business opportunities for smaller institutions, while CRA’s effect on
larger institutions will likely push advances in commodified lending markets,
including home mortgages and credit-scored small business loans that can be
sold into the secondary markets.
In sum, recent evidence shows that CRA provides important benefits to
low-income communities. Other factors undoubtedly contributed to the
growth in lending to low-income communities during the 1990s, but careful
studies have found support for an independent and important role for CRA.
Given the difficulty of finding such effects in policy analysis generally, these
findings are remarkable.
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B.
THE COSTS OF CRA HAVE BEEN OVERSTATED
1. Profitability
While CRA undoubtedly has costs, recent empirical evidence suggests that
those costs were significantly overstated by CRA’s critics.175 CRA loans
appear to be reasonably profitable. A Federal Reserve Board report issued in
2000176 casts significant doubt on the claims made by critics about the likely
performance of CRA loans. The report found that most institutions responded
that CRA lending was profitable or marginally profitable: 82 percent indicated
that CRA-related home mortgage lendingwas profitable, 86 percent indicated
that CRA-related home improvement lending was profitable, 93 percent
indicated that CRA-related community development lending was profitable,
and 96 percent indicated that CRA-related small business lending was
profitable.177 The median difference between return on equity for CRA home
mortgage loans and all such loans, and between CRA small business loans and
all such loans, was zero.178 Most respondents reported that CRA lending was
as profitable or more profitable than all lending.179 The profitability of serving
these borrowers and communities helped drive the increase in CRA-eligible
lending by banks and their affiliates between 1993 and 1998.180
Many respondents reported other benefits from such lending, which
suggest that CRA lending, while strengthening communities, is also profitable
for banks. Eighty-one percent of respondents, for example, developed new
business opportunities from their CRA small business lending.181 Seventy-one
percent of respondents cited “source of additional profits” as a benefit of their
community development lending, and 96 percent cited promoting “community
growth and stability.”182 These broader societal benefits also represent benefits
for the banks operating in these communities because they reduce the risk of
bank lending in those communities, further contradicting the notion that CRA
forces banks to engage in unprofitable activity.
2. Risk
CRA loans appear not to be overly risky. The loss rates that surveyed
banks and thrifts reported for CRA loans are quite low. The median difference
in charge-off rate between CRA home mortgage loans and all such loans was
zero.183 The institutions responding to the survey reported weighted median
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charge-off rates of 0.18 percent on CRA-related home mortgage loans and 0.40
percent on CRA-related small business loans.184 About 70 percent of
respondents reported credit losses for CRA home mortgage lending that were
the same as or less than other such lending, and 91 percent of respondents
reported credit losses for CRA small business loans that were the same as or
smaller than for all small business loans.185 Community development loans
had a median charge-off rate of zero.186 Separate analysis by the Federal
Reserve Board indicated that CRA lending loss rates were stable from 1993 to
1998, even as CRA lending increased dramatically. Generally speaking, the
categories of loans made pursuant to CRA—home mortgage, small business,
multifamily, and community development lending—have had relatively low
loss rates.
3. The Risk-Access Tradeoff
Pushing further into low-income markets has not weakened banks’
profitability and soundness as White, Macey and Miller, and others predicted.
As one would expect, the performance of CRA “special programs” is not as
strong as the performance of CRA loans in the institutions’ general portfolio.
Special programs account for only 17 percent of CRA-eligible lending as the
Federal Reserve Board defines it. These programs serve as the banks’ and
thrifts’ lending “laboratories,” employing new and innovative strategies – such
as lower downpayment requirements – to deliver credit to underserved
borrowers. Once these strategies are refined, they are often “graduated” to
borrowers in the institution’s core product lines.187 Despite the programs’
experimental status, the Board reported that 61 percent of respondents found
CRA special programs to be profitable.188 Moreover, most institutions reported
low delinquency and charge-off rates; the median charge-off rate on these
programs was zero.189
The survey finding that CRA loans are generally profitable is consistent
with other studies. Federal Reserve Board economists determined that, after
adjusting for creditworthiness and the benefits of the home mortgage interest
deduction, banks do not offer borrowers substantially lower mortgage rates to
make CRA-eligible loans.190 Earlier studies found that institutions with strong
CRA performance were as profitable as those with less CRA activity.191
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Similarly, an earlier survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City had
found CRA lending to be profitable, though not as profitable as other
lending.192
That is not to say that the Federal Reserve Board’s survey found no
differences in the performance of CRA loans and other loans. As noted by the
Board’s report,193 previous studies had found that borrowers with lower
incomes were more likely to have their loans become delinquent,194 and that a
combination of negative home equity195 and a “triggering” event such as job
loss was correlated with delinquency and default.196 Affordable home
mortgage products with significant layering of risk were also found to be more
prone to default.197 However, research also concluded that although borrower
and neighborhood income were inversely related to delinquency rates, the
differences were slight, and loan-to-value ratios were far more important.198
Moreover, lenders compensate for such differences in deliquency rates by
charging higher interest rates.
4. Mergers and Acquisitions
Critics overstate the contention that CRA is a costly barrier to efficient
mergers and acquisitions. Treasury Department analysis shows that CRA
likely imposes little costs from disapproval or delay of mergers, acquisitions,
or other applications subject to CRA review.199 From 1985 to 1999, only 692
out of 92,177 applications subject to CRA review received any adverse public
comment—less than 0.7 percent. Of those applications, most received adverse
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public comment or regulatory scrutiny on both CRA and other grounds. Only
1 percent of the applications receiving comment were denied, 4 percent
withdrawn, and 1 percent returned (for reasons that may or may not have
related to CRA), leaving 94 percent approved. Thus the agencies denied less
than one tenth of one percent of the applications subject to CRA review.
Adverse CRA comments also generally lead to little delay. Since CRA’s
enactment, the bank agencies processed 63 percent of applications facing CRA
protests within 90 days, and processed 88 percent of such applications within
180 days. This has improved under the 1995 CRA regulations: almost 75
percent of all applications subject to CRA review are now decided within 90
days and more than 94 percent are decided within 180 days. Regulators
exercise their discretion to ignore frivolous comments.
Of course, the lack of delay or denial is not evidence that CRA is either
ineffective or without cost. Banks and thrifts presumably internalize the risk of
delay or denial and modify their behavior to minimize that risk. A recent study
found that CRA had a significant effect on expanding lending to low-income
communities, controlling for bank characteristics. The study found that banks
increased their lending to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods in
anticipation of the regulatory and public scrutiny from CRA that accompanies
mergers.200 The effects were more pronounced for larger institutions, which
face the most public and regulatory scrutiny, and the effects became stronger
as public and regulatory attention increased under CRA during the 1990s.201
This altered behavior might constitute a cost if CRA loans were not profitable,
yet the Federal Reserve Board’s evidence suggests that CRA lending is
relatively profitable.202
5. Rent Seeking
Macey and Miller argued that CRA creates fertile ground for “extortion”
by community groups using the application process to force banks and thrifts
to make grants to their organizations.203 But available evidence suggests that
rent seeking under CRA is not of the size or scale alleged. As noted above,
only a small percentage of applications receive public comment, and few are
delayed or denied on that basis. The fact that community protests get banks
and thrifts to issue voluntary pledges or make agreements with community
groups to do more lending is not improper. Moreover, NCRC analysis
suggests that only a small fraction of “CRA agreements,” which are
themselves a small fraction of CRA activity, result in payments—for services
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or otherwise—to the community groups making the “protest.”204 Even with
respect to agreements involving payments, one must examine whether the
payments are appropriate payments for services in furtherance of making
sound loans (such as home buyer credit counseling), or are used for some
unrelated purpose.
Recent disclosures required under the “sunshine”
amendments to CRA have revealed little evidence of the rent seeking feared.
6. Compliance Costs
Banks and thrifts also face other costs of compliance, such as paperwork
burdens and the geocoding of loan data, but they are difficult to measure. The
bank and thrift regulators estimated in 1999 that the annual compliance burden
from CRA for data collection and reporting was about 550 to 625 hours per
year for large banks, and about 10 hours per year for small banks, totaling 1.25
million hours per year and costing $35.4 million industry-wide.205 That year,
such a compliance burden would have constituted essentially zero percent of
the $6 trillion in bank assets and 3 billion hours of total bank employee time,206
and less than two- tenths of one percent of the cost of bank regulation.207 These
estimates for large banks are much higher than they had been at the time of the
1995 reforms, as regulators had underestimated geocoding costs, but such costs
have likely decreased since 1999.208 Moreover, the 1995 regulations
streamlined CRA compliance for small banks. Small banks are not required to
collect or report small business or small farm lending data under CRA and
examiners evaluate their performance based on data collected either in the
normal course of business or pursuant to other regulations, including HMDA.
Surveys of bank compliance officers also suggest that the 1995 reforms
reduced the compliance burdens of CRA. The overall compliance costs of
CRA do not rank high, relative to previous years, in the most recent ABA
survey of compliance burdens.209 CRA ranked ninth out of twenty laws and
regulations studied, just after Flood Insurance Rules.210 This rank represents a
204
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dramatic improvement over just a decade ago, when CRA often topped the
ABA survey for most burdensome regulation before the 1995 reforms.211
7. Uncertainty
Some lenders are concerned that uncertainty about what will be required of
them in the CRA examination itself raises compliance costs.212 Costs may be
higher because lenders spend more time documenting activities that turn out to
be relatively unimportant to the examination, or because uncertainty induces
them to undertake activities that in their best judgments are not safe and sound.
One might categorize banks undertaking more CRA-eligible activity than
necessary to achieve the bank’s desired rating as a cost, even if the activity is
profitable and sound. Although this additional activity may have an
opportunity cost from the bank’s perspective, the additional CRA activity, if
prudent, also confers a social benefit that must be weighed in addition to the
profit to the institution.
Although Macey and Miller charged that the pre-1995-reform CRA process
was so vague as to give regulators unfettered discretion,213 recent evidence
suggests that CRA was generally consistently applied during the early 1990s.
A recent study analyzing CRA examinations for several thousand commercial
banks from 1990 to 1996 found that the scheduling of CRA examinations and
the persistence of examination ratings tracked home mortgage loan levels and
other key, objective factors.214 In scheduling examinations, “supervisors
allocate[d] their resources toward institutions with observed CRA compliance
inadequacies.”215 Moreover, the “level of residential lending” influenced the
CRA ratings of banks.216 The study concluded that “CRA enforcement during
this period reflected, at least in part, objective evaluation criteria.”217
Regulator consistency has likely improved under the 1995 reforms, which
focus more on objective lending measures.
8. Shareholder Value
Shareholder value is another possible measure of compliance costs. One
study argued that the 1995 CRA reforms had little effect on shareholder value
and so did not reduce compliance costs.218 The general problems faced by
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event studies in general are well-known,219 but carefully designed event studies
can shed light on regulatory changes designed to enhance shareholder value.
Yet an event study of a reform (like CRA) whose purpose was not solely to
increase shareholder value, but rather to reduce compliance costs, increase
lending, and focus on “performance, not paperwork,” is more complicated to
evaluate from an event-study perspective. For example, the CRA reforms may
have had zero net effect on shareholders, while shifting compliance costs from
less productive processes to investments that lead to more effective lending. In
addition, given that the 1995 CRA reforms continued to employ a standard,
with room for regulatory discretion, it is not surprising that the reforms did not
generate a measurable increase in shareholder value immediately after the final
rule was released. Gains (or losses) to shareholders would take a long time for
even informationally efficient financial markets to transmit, as banks and
thrifts and their regulators gained experience under the new CRA standards.
As the authors acknowledge, their results “could also reflect substantial
uncertainty over the benefits and costs that might arise from reform until it
becomes clear how the new rules will be implemented.”220
C.
RESPONSES TO OTHER CRITIQUES
1. CRA Reasonably Addresses Market Failures
Michael Klausner argued at the time of the 1995 CRA reforms that CRA
was the wrong response to market failures that he deemed likely to exist in
low-income communities.221 In particular, he contended that CRA impedes
specialization among banks in serving low-income communities and makes it
difficult for banks to internalize information externalities, either directly or
indirectly through lending consortia. Klausner argued that banks and thrifts
could not efficiently invest in the expertise needed to lend successfully in all
the low-income communities within their assessment areas. Moreover, he
argued, if many banks and thrifts seek to serve the same low-income area, each
lender will not be able to internalize its information costs, as successful lending
will benefit competitors in that area. Furthermore, with large numbers of
creditors involved, coordination to develop loan consortia would be more
difficult. In addition, Klausner suggested that competition from big banks
seeking to meet CRA obligations would hurt specialized lenders focusing on
low-income areas.
Klausner argued that less competition among banks for scarce loans in lowincome areas, rather than more competition, would permit banks to internalize
more of their costs and develop expertise in low-income areas. Instead of
CRA, Klausner suggested a quota for lending to low-income borrowers that
could be met by trading obligations among banks. In his view, a tradable
quota would permit banks to specialize in lending to particular communities
219
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where they could invest in information, or in funding loans rather than
originating them. Specialization would mean less competition, greater cost
internalization, and easier coordination among fewer lenders seeking to form
loan consortia in low-income areas. Lastly, he argued that a tradable quota
would cost less than the discretionary standards implicit in CRA.
Based on nearly a decade of experience since the 1995 reforms, I argue that
CRA is reasonably aimed at overcoming the market failures both Klausner and
I believe to exist in low-income communities, and that the current CRA
standard is preferable to the quota-and-trade system Klausner proposed.
First, fostering competition among banks and thrifts in serving low-income
areas is good, not bad. Banks generally do not want to be the sole lender in a
low-income community. Banks perceive less risk when other lenders are
serving a low-income community after applying their own credit criteria
regarding property values and neighborhood characteristics, loan terms, and
borrower credit scores. Larger volumes of lending from diverse sources add
liquidity to the market that decreases the riskiness of each bank’s loan.
Second, CRA has helped, not deterred, banks in developing specialization
in serving low-income communities. One important type of specialization
spans geographic areas: innovation in developing products that meet the credit
needs of low-income areas with manageable risks. And CRA does encourage
banks to develop specialization in serving particular geographic areas. For
example, banks partner with CDFIs and community-based organizations to
penetrate low-income markets where they have not operated at scale before.
Third, competition from banks and thrifts under CRA has helped, not hurt,
specialized lenders; these lenders complement, but do not replace, large
institutions. Under CRA, banks and thrifts have entered markets where only
specialized institutions such as ShoreBank had worked before. But the effect
of entry has been positive. ShoreBank and other institutions like it
demonstrated the possibility of lending in low-income communities and have
partnered with banks on an ongoing basis. Specialized lenders provide local
expertise, cover some of the costs of lending in low-income areas (such as
financial education and counseling), and take portions of the risk of a particular
loan or project that banks do not want to bear. In turn, banks have invested in
CDFIs in record numbers, largely spurred by the CRA investment test.
Investments in CDFIs strengthen the ability of banks and thrifts to serve lowincome markets. As banks offer services once only offered by CDFIs, the
local institutions move further “downstream,” reaching lower-income or
harder-to-serve borrowers, and developing new approaches that mainstream
institutions may later find cost-effective. Specialized lenders play important
roles in low-income communities, but they are no substitute for robust and
competitive markets that include mainstream banks and thrifts.222
Fourth, CRA provides a pre-commitment device that actually helps banks
coordinate lending to reduce information costs. Because CRA requires all
222
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insured depositories to lend to their entire communities, it reduces the free
rider problems that would otherwise plague loan consortia. As evidence from
the last decade attests, CRA has spurred the development of loan consortia to
learn how to serve low- and moderate-income communities more effectively.
The 1995 regulations treat loans made by such consortia as “community
development lending” rather than home mortgage or small business lending.
Yet community development lending is an important part of an institution’s
performance under the CRA lending test. Moreover, institutions can and do
easily move consortia home mortgage or small business loans onto their own
books as home mortgage or small business originations or purchases when
appropriate, where they “count” toward the CRA lending test.223
Lastly, CRA after the 1995 reforms provides much of the flexibility and
other benefits Klausner’s proposal would have offered. And it does so without
the downside of fixed quotas for lending, which are not required for a trading
system to work. Under the 1995 reforms, banks and thrifts get equal CRA
consideration for both originating and purchasing eligible loans, creating a sort
of trading system. Institutions can rely on the origination expertise of others to
purchase loans on the robust market for CRA loans. The development of this
CRA loan market increases liquidity and reduces loan prices. It also improves
transparency in CRA loan pricing, providing valuable information to
regulators, communities, and banks and thrifts themselves about the
performance and profitability of CRA lending.
2. CRA Does Not Make Banks Avoid Low-Income Communities
Macey and Miller charged that CRA created incentives for banks and
thrifts to avoid opening deposit facilities in low-income communities because
of the expense of complying with CRA.224 Their contention was subject to
challenge even at the time that they made it.225 Today, the revised rules mean
that view is clearly incorrect. Under the 1995 regulations, assessment areas
“[c]onsist generally of one or more [metropolitan statistical areas] . . . or one or
more contiguous political subdivisions, such as counties, cities, or towns” that
include the census tracts “in which the bank has its main office, its branches,
and its deposit-taking ATMs, as well as the surrounding [census tracts] in
which the bank has originated or purchased a substantial portion of its
loans.”226 A bank or thrift “may adjust the boundaries of its assessment area(s)
to include only the portion of a political subdivision that it reasonably can be
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expected to serve.”227 However, assessment areas “[m]ay not reflect illegal
discrimination” and “[m]ay not arbitrarily exclude low- or moderate-income
geographies.”228 Banks can delineate their assessment areas as they see fit,
subject only to these regulatory requirements.
The current definitions for assessment areas render Macey and Miller’s
critique inapt. Assessment areas are drawn broadly to comport with political
boundary lines and usually include a diverse range of neighborhoods measured
by income, race and other demographics. Putting a branch into a low-income
neighborhood in a metropolitan area where a bank operates does not affect the
bank’s obligations under the lending test, which will already be based on the
entirety of the community’s income spectrum. Moreover, the regulation bars
“arbitrarily exclud[ing]” low- or moderate-income areas regardless of whether
the bank has a branch in such a neighborhood. Finally, regulators have
discretion to evaluate a bank’s lending outside its assessment areas,
diminishing the importance of the areas’ precise boundaries.
3.
Applying CRA to Insured Depositories Is Justified
Critics of CRA argue that it makes little sense to apply CRA to banks and
thrifts while exempting credit unions, independent mortgage companies and
other finance companies—let alone securities firms, insurance companies, and
non-financial companies—from similar regulation. There is some validity to
the critique, but let me offer some basic reasons why applying CRA to banks
and thrifts is not as illogical as critics suggest. Federally insured depository
institutions benefit from numerous government subsidies, such as deposit
insurance and access to the Federal Reserve Board’s discount window. The
first subsection details these and other subsidies while the next explains why
such subsidies provide additional justification for applying CRA to banks and
thrifts. The final subsection explains how depository institutions’ specialized
role in financial markets justifies CRA’s application to them.
a) Subsidies
Deposit insurance subsidizes banks and thrifts by lowering their cost of
capital. As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has described:
[A] major reason the Congress is called upon to involve itself in …
financial markets is the safety net. Institutions covered by it receive a
subsidy because insured depositors correctly perceive their risk
exposure as virtually zero. These depositors--and other creditors who
benefit from the stability brought to the banking system by the safety
net--are willing therefore to provide funds to banks at much lower
rates than are available to competing institutions.229
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Most banks receive the benefits of deposit insurance at no annual cost to them.
Under rules prescribed by the Deposit Insurance Fund Act of 1996, almost all
banks—ninety-two percent—do not pay annual deposit insurance premiums.230
More than nine hundred institutions have never paid any premiums for deposit
insurance, and many institutions that have grown rapidly have paid low
premiums compared with their coverage.231 Even the weakest institutions pay
only a $0.27 premium on every $100 of deposits.232 While these rules strongly
need reform, better risk-based pricing would not fully eliminate the
governmental subsidy.233 The government subsidy probably benefits small
banks disproportionately to their asset size. Small banks rely more on insured
deposits for funding than large banks. Furthermore, small banks would have a
relatively hard time attracting funding in the absence of deposit insurance
because they would be perceived as riskier.
Large banks and thrifts also likely benefit from a market perception that
regulators will not let large institutions fail because the consequences to the
financial system would be too severe. Regulators fostered this perception
through a series of interventions, including in one instance an explicit “too big
to fail” policy statement.234 Important legal changes at the end of the 1990s
that significantly curtailed the discretion regulators have to bail out uninsured
depositors.235 Yet the market perception likely persists that the government
will intervene to assist large institutions236 and that such assistance will benefit
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creditors and shareholders even if they must bear some loss in the process.
Evidence from the Federal Reserve Board’s intervention when the hedge fund
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) collapsed in 1998 suggests that
markets may have perceived a “too big to fail” subsidy. Large, complex
banking organizations saw their cost of funds decline after the Federal Reserve
Board’s intervention, although such effects are difficult to disentangle from
investors’ general “flight to safety” following the LTCM collapse.237 The
subsidy from a “too big to fail” policy may have grown over the last decade, as
consolidation has led to the growth of enormous banking institutions, with
fewer intermediaries holding a larger percentage of deposits.238
Banks uniquely receive subsidies from other sources as well. The Federal
Reserve Board’s sponsorship of the payments network,239 and its provision of
riskless financial settlement by guaranteeing large payments among banks,240
are additional sources of subsidy to the banking system.241 Direct access to the
Federal Reserve Board’s discount window provides assurance to the market
about banks’ and thrifts’ stability. It therefore allows institutions to obtain
lower cost of funds, regardless of whether they draw on the window and of the
price the Board charges. Lastly, banks benefit from subsidies through
government-sponsored enterprises and other government programs. For
example, bank members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system
accrue 90 percent of the $3 billion in flows of governmental subsidy to the
FHLBs, while only 10 percent is passed on to home buyers in lower mortgage
rates.242 Admittedly, the gross subsidies to banks are offset to some degree by
the costs of bank regulation, including reserve requirements.243

market clearly believes that large institutions are not too big for uninsured creditors to take at
least some loss”).
237
CRAIG FURFINE, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MORAL SUASION: EVIDENCE FROM THE
RESCUE OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 18-20 (2001).
238
The share of deposits held by the top ten bank holding companies grew from 19 percent in
1993 to 34 percent in 2003. The largest bank holding company by deposit size held 7.6
percent of all deposits in 2003, compared with 3.7 percent a decade earlier. The number of
banks and thrifts dropped over the last decade by 32 percent. The number of banks with over
$10 billion in assets grew from 64 in 1994 to 110 a decade later, and the share of deposits held
by such large institutions doubled over the last decade, from 30 percent in 1994 to over 60
percent last year. Author’s calculations, based on FDIC Statistics of Deposits, at
http://www.fdic.gov/sod.
239
See Federal Reserve’s Key Policies for the Provision of Financial Services, at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/pricing/default.htm (visited July 23, 2004).
240
Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and
Implications for Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 3 (1999).
241
Hearing on H.R. 10, supra note 229 (testimony of Fed. Res. Bd. Chairman Alan
Greenspan) (“The markets place substantial values on these safety net subsidies [such as the
discount window and riskless financial settlement], clearly in excess of the cost of regulation. .
. . [W]ere it otherwise, some banks would be dropping their charters.”)
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Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Federal Subsidies and the Housing GSEs,” May
2001, available at http://ftp.cbo.gov/28xx/doc2841/GSEs.pdf, at 25-28 [hereinafter “CBO
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b) Aligning Subsidies with PublicP urposes
Given that insured depositories receive significant governmental subsidies,
the question remains whether such subsidies provide any justification for
applying CRA to banks and thrifts. The first-best policy response to bank
subsidies is to reduce such subsidies directly. For example, one could reduce
subsidies from deposit insurance by establishing better risk-based pricing and
ensuring that all institutions pay some premium. Regulators’ refusal to
intervene in financial markets could reinforce that there is no institution “too
big to fail.” The Federal Reserve Board could continue to move towards more
market-based pricing of access to the payments system and the discount
window.244 GSE subsidies that are passed through to banks and thrifts could
be reduced through higher capital standards and other means.
However, each of these first-best solutions to reduce bank and thrift
subsidies has faced enormous political opposition and would entail significant
costs. Deposit insurance reform legislation invariably includes increases in the
amount subject to deposit insurance, and even better risk-based pricing would
leave some significant governmental subsidy remaining. Refusal to intervene
in financial markets is an important principle to announce in the abstract, but
officials faced with difficult choices and uncertain information often intervene
to prevent financial collapse. Pricing payment system services at true market
rates might result in socially suboptimal development of payment networks.245
Efforts to reduce GSE subsidies by increasing capital requirements and
affordable housing goals while reducing indicia of government support have
faced enormous political opposition. Moreover, squeezing subsidies out of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may simply balloon subsidies going to the
FHLBs and insured depositories.246
Study 2001”]. Some portion of the subsidy that accrues to banks is passed on to non-homemortgage borrowers of the banks.
243
See Jones & Kolatch, supra note 240. Whether a net subsidy exists sparked vociferous
debate during negotiations over financial modernization, with the Federal Reserve Board
taking the self-interested position that such a subsidy was significant and thus new activities
should be undertaken in affiliates within a holding company, and the OCC taking the selfinterested position that no such subsidy exists, so that new activities could be undertaken in
subsidiaries of national banks. The debate was effectively resolved by legislating “firewalls”
between the bank and its affiliates and subsidiaries such that any net subsidy could not be
effectively passed through to other entities engaged in new activities.
244
See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board, Press Release (Oct. 31, 2002) (noting changes to discount
window regulations that would result in credit being provided through the discount window at
rates
above
the
target
federal
funds
rate),
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2002/200210312/default.htm.
245
See, e.g., Barr, supra note 1, at 222 (arguing that the Federal Reserve Board should consider
lowering prices for certain electronic payment services in order to expand access to banking
services for the poor).
246
See White, supra note 4. Moreover, FHLB “reform” has tended to expand, rather than
restrict, use of subsidized advances, and given the fungibility of money, nominally restricting
use of advances, rather than reducing them, is unlikely to prevent FHLB members from
absorbing the advances as undifferentiated subsidies in any event.
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Given that we live in a second-best world in which these subsidies to banks
and thrifts will remain, simply removing CRA would not restore credit markets
to a “free market.” Existing subsidies, taxes, and regulations distort the free
market in a variety of ways. As a theoretical matter, one cannot assert, given
these distortions, that moving from an “nth” best world with CRA to the next
best world without CRA would be efficient. In a regulated, subsidized credit
market world, it is not improper to ensure that some portion of the subsidy
goes to a public purpose by applying CRA to banks and thrifts.247
c) Role in Financial Markets
Market failures have plagued low-income communities and that minority
households have faced discrimination in credit and housing markets.248 Given
these problems, government regulation should encourage depositories to
overcome them. Banks play a special role in financial markets by focusing on
relational lending and investing in techniques to “thicken” the markets within
which they operate by generating and analyzing information on opaque
values.249 This role is distinct from that of capital markets,250 which focus on
information-rich, transparent, and larger firms. It is even distinct from that of
independent mortgage companies, which focus on transactions rather than
relationships and thus have not similarly developed the technologies and
expertise that permit banks to manage higher-risk borrowers.251 CRA is
consistent with insured depositories’ specialized role.
The fact that credit unions are not subject to CRA is an anomaly in this
regard. There is little justification in not extending CRA to credit unions, most
of which enjoy federally insured deposit insurance, are subject to
comprehensive regulation and supervision, and benefit from many of the
subsidies available to banks and thrifts. Moreover, credit unions enjoy tax
exemption not available to banks and thrifts and are chartered with a public
purpose to serve “people of modest means.”252 For that reason, CRA should be
extended to credit unions.253

247

Cf., e.g., White, supra note 4 (explaining why eliminating the GSEs would not necessarily
lead to more efficient policy outcomes).
248
See supra Part III.
249
See, e.g., CANNER ET AL., supra note 190.
250
See id., (citing P. Bolton & X. Freixas, Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure
and Financial Market Equilibrium Under Asymmetric Information, 108 J. POL. ECON. 324
(2000); Boot & Thakor, Financial System Architecture, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 693 (1997); Boot
& Thakor, Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?, 55 J. FINANCE 679 (2000)).
251
CANNER ET AL., supra note 190. This may help to explain why subprime lenders focus on
making loans to existing home mortgage borrowers as to whose creditworthiness others have
already invested in learning.
252
Credit unions are tax exempt, 12 U.S.C. § 1768 (2000), because their mission is to serve
“people of modest means,” 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000).
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I advocated this position as part of the Treasury team that developed a proposal to extend
community investment obligations to credit unions, but the measure was defeated and was not
included in the Credit Union Membership Act, Pub. L. No. 105-219 (Aug. 7, 1998).
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4. Current Enforcement Methods Compare Favorably with Enforcement
Through Safe Harbors
Peter Swire argued prior to the 1995 reforms that enforcement of CRA
through both regular examinations and reviews after “episodic” protests of
applications for mergers ought to be replaced with a safe harbor for institutions
that achieve some given level of CRA performance.254 In his view, a safe
harbor would provide a strong incentive for banks to make more loans or
invest in CDFIs at lower compliance cost. Under his proposal, regulators
would set a target level of community development investment. If a bank met
the target, the institution would not undergo CRA examinations or face CRA
scrutiny during merger applications. Variations of the Swire proposal, under
which banks receiving an “outstanding” rating on their most recent
examination would not face CRA scrutiny during merger reviews, were
discussed in 1995, and have been introduced in Congress repeatedly since then.
A safe harbor based on a bank’s CRA rating has a number of
disadvantages. First, a bank’s CRA rating can become stale. Circumstances
can change after an examination, examiners may miss evidence with respect to
a particular market, or applications may involve new markets not covered
under the examination. Banks and thrifts are usually examined every two to
three years. A bank’s performance may change significantly in the interim.
The “safe harbor” would prevent regulators from considering such matters.
Second, CRA ratings are not conclusive. The ratings are intended to reflect
a bank’s performance in meeting the credit needs of all its communities. But
an outstanding rating does not necessarily mean that the depository
institution’s record is exemplary in every market that it serves. Many of the
communities served by depository institutions are not evaluated during an
examination. In the case of large banks serving multiple markets, regulators
only sample a portion of these markets to determine the lender’s CRA rating.
In addition, CRA performance in larger communities receives more weight.
Thus, a bank may receive a “satisfactory” CRA rating even when there is
documented poor performance in small communities.
Third, providing a safe harbor would eliminate or severely curtail the role
of the public in shaping regulatory norms. As I argue more fully in Part VI,
public engagement in setting CRA standards, while costly, is a value worth
preserving. Under the safe harbor proposals, public input would be confined to
regular examinations. It would be inefficient and costly for small community
organizations to provide extensive comment on every bank examination.
Public comment is more focused in the context of a change in a financial
institution that is likely to have a significant impact on the community.
Materials received during application processes often provide relevant and
valuable information to regulators on an institution’s CRA performance.
Under the Swire proposal, regulators would set numerical targets for
investment and institutions meeting that target would not even be subject to
254

Swire, supra note 18.
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examination. The public role in CRA examinations would be eliminated.
Numerical targets would ignore important contextual factors that influence a
bank’s or thrift’s ability to make sound loans in low-income communities. A
safe harbor could encourage banks to make less profitable and riskier loans
than under the current approach, which takes into account the performance
context within which the institution operates. A numerical target also raises
serious objections on the grounds of credit allocation. Moreover, without
regular CRA examinations, regulators would have no context in which to learn
about how the best institutions meet the community’s credit needs—which
would seriously hamper the regulators’ ability to set appropriate numerical
targets, and would also undermine regulators’ ability to share information
about best practices with other institutions. Such sharing of best practices
lowers the cost of innovation and provides significant benefits to banks and the
communities that they serve. Fixed numerical targets, whether promulgated as
a rule or a safe harbor, should be eschewed.
Fourth, the 1995 CRA regulations provide incentives for banks to achieve
outstanding CRA ratings that safe harbors would not. The frequency of CRA
examinations is based in part on previous CRA performance. Moreover, in
CRA reviews during mergers, the regulators place great weight on the previous
CRA examination. Despite some cases to the contrary, a strong prior CRA
record is usually a good indicator for successful completion of CRA reviews
during mergers.255 Thus, current policy combines efficient use of agency
resources with incentives for good performance, while ensuring that new
information that comes to light during applications can be properly assessed.
As part of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act,
Congress codified additional incentives for small banks with good CRA
ratings. Rejecting Senator Gramm’s proposals for both a complete small bank
exemption from CRA and a safe harbor for small banks with outstanding CRA
ratings, Congress enacted a provision that generally increased the time between
CRA examinations for small banks with outstanding and satisfactory CRA
ratings. Under the Act, small banks with outstanding ratings will generally be
examined every five years.256 Small banks with satisfactory ratings will
generally be examined every four years.257 Notwithstanding these provisions,
small banks will still be examined in connection with applications for deposit
facilities and mergers, and may be examined more frequently when the
regulator determines that there is reasonable cause.258 While in my judgment
such time periods are too long, they do provide an incentive for small banks
with less frequent mergers to perform better under CRA. Unlike safe harbors,
the Act retains regulators’ discretion to examine banks more frequently when
255

But see Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 328-29, 334-37 (citing examples of community
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12 U.S.C. § 2908(a)(1) (2000).
257
Id. § 2908(a)(2).
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appropriate and to undertake a CRA review when small banks merge or apply
for deposit facilities, which can have significant effects on local communities.
5. Localism
Critics charge that CRA had its origins in “localist” rhetoric that has no
place in the globalized financial marketplace. In a sense, they are correct.
Some support for CRA has been, and is, rooted in old-fashioned notions that
the local bank should lend locally or even that the local bank should use funds
raised locally to lend locally. Today, bank geographic restrictions have largely
given way to real competition in interstate banking and to massive
consolidation in the industry. An emphasis on local lending loses a lot of its
meaning in this context. Moreover, geographic diversification is an important
element of most banks’ safety and soundness. Still, there are some reasons to
favor local lending, in the sense of having some local presence from which
banks gain expertise and use their superior knowledge to find creditworthy
borrowers and make profitable loans.
Yet supporters of CRA need not rely on localist theories, given that market
failures and discrimination provide adequate foundations for CRA. Besides,
CRA’s current formulation does not lean heavily on localist policies. Large
institutions operate across wide geographic areas and can raise funds and make
loans consistent with their nationwide (or international) business plans.
Institutions are not measured based on how the size of their lending in a
particular location relates to the size of their deposits in that location, but rather
to the lending of their peer institutions and other contextual factors. Loan
consortia, as well as the active secondary market for CRA loans, which permits
banks to purchase loans in order to enhance their CRA performance, further
diminishes the “local” nature of CRA-eligible lending.
V. CRA COMPARED WITH OTHER CREDIT MARKET REGULATIONS
Critics of CRA have argued that if the government must intervene in credit
markets, it should do so through other means. The presence of market failures
are an insufficient determinant of policy. The government may be ill equipped
to intervene, and may choose strategies that either make the problems worse or
cost more than their benefits. Government agencies might not possess the
requisite information to regulate effectively, the agencies may not be able to
induce the private sector responses sought, the bureaucracy might not faithfully
execute the laws, or the political process might lead Congress or the
bureaucracy to create laws that improperly favor the regulated entities or some
other preferred groups.259 The extent of these problems cannot be assessed in
the abstract. One needs to compare CRA with other potential systems for
redressing market failures.260 Thus, to evaluate CRA, I compare it to a series
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of other policies designed to expand access to capital. This Part examines
existing alternatives, while the next Part focuses on broader potential ones.
I classify credit market policies into five types. First, CRA sets forth a
broad affirmative obligation on insured depository institutions to lend in their
service areas. Second, negative prohibitions, such as the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA),261 bar discrimination against minority borrowers.
Third, disclosure laws may be thought of as having two sub-types. Some laws,
such as the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),262 assist in the
enforcement of other legal rules or social norms by requiring public disclosure
of lending data. Other disclosure laws, such as the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA),263 rely on providing information to consumers to ensure a well
functioning market, backed by enforcement of the disclosure requirement.
Fourth, Congress enacted substantive regulation of loan products in the Home
Owners Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).264 Fifth, government subsidies are
pervasive in the housing credit market.265 This Part compares CRA to the
other four approaches to credit market regulation. I argue that on many
measures, CRA is no worse, and in some cases better, than these alternatives.
Further comparative institutional analysis based on empirical research will be
critical to understanding the relative efficiency of these laws.
A.
BACKGROUND
This Section sets out a brief background on each of the relevant laws. A
trio of laws—CRA, HMDA, and ECOA—was enacted in the 1970s to address
perceived problems in credit markets. HMDA requires most home mortgage
creditors annually to disclose to the public information about home mortgage
loans made or purchased, as well as loan applications denied.266 Regulations
require disclosure of race, ethnicity, sex, and income of borrowers. Unlike
TILA,267 HMDA is not designed to enhance borrower information. Rather,
HMDA is designed to increase the ability of the public, regulators, and fair
261

15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f.
12 U.S.C. § 2801. The Federal Reserve Board implements HMDA under Regulation C, 12
C.F.R. pt. 230.1.
263
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Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994).
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information and thereby enhance competition. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 635
(arguing for disclosure rather than product regulation). Unfortunately, TILA is extraordinarily
complex. See, e.g., Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F. 3d 1343, 1346 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner,
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lending enforcement agencies to assess whether lenders are engaged in
discriminatory practices and how lenders are meeting their CRA obligations.
Because HMDA does not include information on creditworthiness, loan terms,
or property characteristics, HMDA data alone provide poor measures of
discrimination. However, wide availability of these data has empowered the
public to assess on financial institution performance.
ECOA prohibits creditors from discriminating in the provision of credit on
the basis of “race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or
age.”268 For home mortgage lending, that prohibition is also reinforced by the
Fair Housing Act of 1968.269 The federal banking regulators supervise and
examine depository institutions for compliance with ECOA and may take
enforcement action against institutions found to discriminate. While the
Federal Trade Commission enforces ECOA against non-depository creditors, it
lacks the authority to supervise or examine these creditors. The Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has responsibility for investigating
complaints under the Fair Housing Act, and the Department of Justice has
responsibility for bringing cases alleging a “pattern or practice” of fair lending
violations under either act against any creditor.
Congress enacted HOEPA270 in 1994 to respond to unscrupulous lending
practices in the subprime home equity mortgage market. For some “high cost”
loans, HOEPA imposes restrictions on certain contract provisions, provides for
enhanced disclosures, and enhances remedies for violations.271
HOEPA
restricts prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and negative amortization
under some circumstances. Lenders are forbidden from engaging in a pattern
or practice of making high-cost loans without regard to the borrower’s ability
to repay from income (rather than from home equity). For any mortgage loan,
the Federal Reserve Board has regulatory authority to prohibit acts or practices
that the Board finds to be unfair, deceptive, or designed to evade HOEPA. The
Board can also prohibit acts or practices in connection with refinance loans
that the Board finds to be abusive or not in the interest of the borrower.
In addition to product regulation, HOEPA provides directly and indirectly
for enhanced disclosures for borrowers facing high cost loans. HOEPA
directly enhances disclosure by requiring creditors to disclose mortgage terms
268

15 U.S.C. §1691.
42 U.S.C. §3605. The Fair Housing Act also covers other forms of discrimination in
residential real estate transactions beyond fair lending violations.
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Pub. L No. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994).
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HOEPA covers mortgage refinancing loans and closed-end home equity loans with annual
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amount adjusted for inflation (just under $500 for 2004). The statute sets a default rate of 10
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authority to adjust downward to 8 percentage points or upward to 12 percentage points. The
Board adjusted the APR to 8 percentage points in 2001. Final Rule, Federal Reserve System,
12 C.F.R. Part 226, Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65604, Dec. 20, 2001.
269

Credit Where It Counts

49

three days in advance of closing. Indirectly, HOEPA product restrictions tend
to drive more of the cost of the loan into the APR so that consumers can better
understand the costs of the loan and comparison shop.
Finally, there are a series of subsidies to credit. Most housing subsidies are
not aimed at improving access to credit for low- and moderate-income
borrowers or redressing housing discrimination. Rather, they mostly subsidize
the “American dream” of homeownership for all. Subsidies to home mortgage
credit include government insurance (through the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA
) , and the Government National Mortgage Association
(“Ginnie Mae”)) and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),272 including
the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), and the Federal Home Loan
Bank (FHLB) system. Tax expenditures and grant programs, including the
home mortgage interest and property tax deductions, as well as a wide range of
other programs, also affect housing markets. I leave analysis of the housing
subsidies in the tax code for others,273 or another day. Here I focus only on
comparing CRA to FHA and the GSEs as illustrative.274
During the Great Depression, Congress established FHA
, the FHLBs, and
Fannie Mae to fill a gap left by the collapse of the private mortgage insurance
industry “under the weight of a default rate approaching 50 percent and
, which operates within
foreclosures exceeding 1,000 per day….”275 FHA
272

“In general, GSEs are financial institutions established and chartered by the federal
government, as privately owned entities, to facilitate the flow of funds to selected credit
markets….” Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Federal Subsidies and the Housing GSEs,”
May 2001, at http://ftp.cbo.gov/28xx/doc2841/GSEs.pdf, at 1 [hereinafter “CBO Study
2001”].
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Paper 88, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 2001) (finding that the subsidy from the mortgage interest
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at or below the median); see also Steven C. Bourassa & William G. Grigsby, Income Tax
Concessions for Owner-Occupied Housing, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 521, 523 (2000);
James R. Follain & Robert M. Dunsky, The Demand for Mortgage Debt and the Income Tax, 8
J. HOUSING RES. 155 (1997); James R. Follain & Lisa Sturman Melamed, The False Messiah
of Tax Policy: What Elimination of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Promises and a
Careful Look at What It Delivers, 9 J. HOUSING RES.179 (1998); John C. Weicher, Comment
on Steven C. Bourassa and William G. Grigsby’s “Income Tax Concessions for OwnerOccupied Housing,” 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 547 (2000).
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In addition to subsidies in the credit markets, subsidies affect other aspects of the home
mortgage transaction, and other subsidies assist households who rent, including the section 8
voucher program and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit. While these non-credit-market
subsidies are beyond the scope of this article, they nonetheless alter the market context for
home mortgage credit, and themselves may be alternatives to subsidizing the credit market.
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HUD, insures home mortgage loans made by private lenders in the event of
default. FHA is intended to serve borrowers “who lack the savings, credit
history or income to qualify for a conventional mortgage.”276 Ginnie Mae, also
within HUD, provides a credit enhancement to pools of FHA loans and places
them for sale on the secondary market. From its inception in 1934 to 2001, the
FHA insured nearly 30 million home mortgages.277 In 2002 alone, FHA
insured $150 billion in mortgages for nearly 1.3 million households.278
The housing GSEs—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHLBs—were
created to “provide liquidity and stability to the home mortgage market,
thereby increasing the flow of funds available to mortgage borrowers.”279
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue debt to buy and hold mortgages in
portfolio, and insure mortgage-backed securities issued to investors.280 Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac are restricted to the market for conventional, conforming
loans,281 and essentially fund all net new loans meeting those criteria.282 The
FHLBs were created to provide short-term loans (“advances”) to thrifts in
order to stabilize mortgage lending in local markets. Today, FHLB
membership is broad, including the largest commercial banks, and advances to
members can be issued on a variety of collateral and used for any purpose.283
The GSEs are subject to capital requirements and regulatory oversight.
The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) regulates
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.284 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac currently hold
capital well in excess of the amounts required,285 but recent accounting
problems at Freddie Mac have undermined confidence that the GSEs, and their
regulators, have an adequate grasp on their risk. HUD setsaffordable housing
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goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Federal Housing Finance Board
regulates the FHLBs.
B.
CRA COMPARED WITH FAIR LENDING LAW
Critics of CRA contend that, if CRA is aimed at redressing racial
discrimination, the government should simply enforce ECOA instead.286
ECOA does seem to help increase lending to minorities. For example, the
share of bank and thrift lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and
areas that went to minority borrowers increased from 21 to 28 percent from
1993 to 1999. Most of the increase occurred during a period of intense Justice
Department focus on enforcing fair lending laws, from 1993 to 1995.287
Yet CRA may help uncover some practices with discriminatory effects that
both disparate treatment analysis and disparate impact analysis as they are
currently formulated have a hard time detecting or remedying. For example,
ECOA’s disparate treatment and impact tests cannot easily detect
discriminatory overages, yield spread premiums, risk-based pricing, or
segmented markets.288 Moreover, relying on ECOA lawsuits alone to advance
anti-discrimination norms has its own limitations. Few ECOA lawsuits have
been brought. Developing proof of lending discrimination is costly and
difficult. When credit scoring is not the sole basis for a lending decision,
lenders have a high degree of discretion, particularly in the case of applicants
who are neither highly qualified not unqualified. Even when credit scoring is
the sole basis, disparate treatment might arise when creditors subjectively
evaluate data before entering it into the credit system, when creditors provide
different levels of assistance to borrowers in completing credit applications, or
when creditors permit overrides of credit scoring in close cases. Given the
complex and proprietary nature of credit scoring systems, and the difficulty of
proving that any two applicants are similarly situated except for race, disparate
treatment is hard to prove. Disparate impact analysis is often no easier.
Creditors have essential information about their loan portfolio and proprietary
credit evaluation systems and the weights placed on all the variables in their
system. Plaintiffs do not have such information, and creditors resist revealing
their methodology because of competitive concerns.289
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ECOA’s weaknesses do not necessarily imply that CRA is the only, or
even the best, answer to credit market discrimination. ECOA itself sets out
important anti-discrimination norms, and should be strengthened. And
building on the strength of HMDA, “cross-modal” strategies, such as a
disclosure law requiring creditors to disclose the borrower’s credit score and
the creditor’s rate sheet, could help address price discrimination. A new law
on product regulation could bar the payment of yield spread premiums, which
disproportionately fall on minority borrowers.
Still, CRA plays an important role in reinforcing the anti-discrimination
principles underlying ECOA and in expanding access to credit for minority
borrowers. Minority households are disproportionately represented among
low- and moderate-income households and in low- and moderate-income
communities. CRA has encouraged banks and thrifts to increase their lending
in such communities significantly, and minority households now constitute a
larger share of such lending than they did a decade ago. CRA’s focus on lowincome neighborhoods may address structural inequalities facing African
Americans and other minorities more effectively than ECOA’s disparate
impact standard, which is hemmed in by equal protection jurisprudence and the
business necessity defense.290 Moreover, CRA goes beyond ECOA’s focus on
credit discrimination to address broader market failures affecting low-income
borrowers and communities. While CRA helps to reinforce ECOA, fair
lending laws are no substitute for CRA.
C.
CRA COMPARED WITH DISCLOSURE LAW
Disclosure laws are perennial favorites in the legal literature.291 I agree
that disclosure can help to improve the home mortgage credit market.
However, I take issue with disclosure advocates on three grounds. First,
disclosure serves a broader set of purposes than usually posited. Second, I
have a healthier dose of skepticism about the effectiveness of disclosure in
helping households than legal scholars have recently espoused.292 Third, I
argue that disclosure is no substitute for CRA.
There are two basic types of disclosure: disclosures designed to improve
market efficiency by making consumers better shoppers and disclosures
designed to help regulators enforce other laws and push markets towards
compliance with social norms. TILA represents the first type, requiring
disclosures to individual consumers regarding the cost of loans that they
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negotiate, calculated as an APR.293 This type of disclosure seeks to remedy
asymmetric information and improve market competition and efficiency.294
HMDA represents the second type of disclosure, requiring information not
only for the consumer but also for regulators and the market generally. These
broader disclosures reinforce positive social norms, promote market efficiency,
and enhance the regulatory effectiveness of other laws.295 The collection and
public disclosure of information is the essential underpinning of CRA, ECOA,
and HOEPA in expanding access to credit. Public debate over this
performance likely contributed to increased lending to minorities in the 1990s.
Yet relying on HMDA alone to overcome market failures and
discrimination could in theory lead to “over-enforcement” of antidiscrimination and community investment norms. HMDA information does
not contain measures of creditworthiness, loan terms, or property
characteristics that influence creditor decisions. Relying on HMDA data alone
can lead to dramatic overstatements of lending discrimination. Similarly,
HMDA data do not provide any context for understanding creditors’ ability to
lend in low-income communities, so banks and thrifts might face undue
pressure to make unsound loans. Conversely, relying solely on public
disclosure could lead to under-enforcement of equal protection and community
investment norms. Without fair lending laws, HMDA’s disclosure might
convey less approbation. Without CRA, disclosure under HMDA that a bank
did little lending in low-income communities would have little consequence.
Although HOEPA’s disclosure requirements and TILA facilitate
comparison shopping by consumers, in some cases too much information is
provided for consumers to use, and in other cases too little,. Even outside of
the subprime market, there is little reason to think that consumers understand
most aspects of mortgage transactions.296 Decision theory suggests a need for
simplicity: individuals faced with complex problems simplify them to one or
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two major decisions.297 In addition, mortgage brokers can take advantage of
borrowers, who trust mortgage brokers to provide them with full and accurate
information and to provide them with the best loan product. Yet it is in the
broker’s interest to provide the borrower with the highest rate loan that the
broker can convince the borrower to accept. Brokers can earn higher yield
spread premiums for placing borrowers into more expensive loans than ones
for which the borrower could qualify. Unlike retail consumer markets in
which commodities are nearly impossible to price differentially (e.g., Cheerios
in supermarkets), individual transactions for home mortgages present the
possibility for price discrimination based on sophistication and willingness and
ability to shop for better terms.298 With credit scoring, creditors know whether
borrowers qualify for a less expensive loan, while most borrowers do not.299
The efficacy of disclosures is diminished by inadequacies in the nature and
timing of disclosures,300 their limited effect on consumer behavior, and
consumers’ cognitive limitations. First, TILA disclosure typically occurs after
a deal has been negotiated and the consumer has invested substantial lenderspecific search and negotiation costs.301 Second, TILA disclosure may not
actually be noticed, read, or understood by consumers, who often have limited
finance or English-language skills.302 In one survey, 75 percent of respondents
either agreed somewhat or agreed strongly that TILA statements are
complicated.303 Third, TILA disclosures may inundate the consumer with so
much data that the most important aspects of the contract, such as the APR, are
swallowed by the details.304 The need for simplicity conflicts, however, with
the goal of producing comprehensive disclosures that would permit consumers
297
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to comparison shop based on the real price of loans. Fourth, this effect is
exacerbated for low-income and minority buyers, for whom alternative credit
options are more limited. Low-income buyers are the least likely to be aware
of alternative credit options and the least likely to shop for alternate financing
arrangements.305 Each of these problems is exacerbated in the subprime
market, making disclosure laws even less likely to be effective.306
Disclosures can and should undoubtedly be improved,307 but the current
structure of the home mortgage market in low-income communities suggests
that disclosure will not significantly affect either consumer or creditor
behavior. Financial education can play a role in helping consumers understand
disclosures better. It is hard to find scholarly literature or policy advocates
who do not end a discussion of disclosure with a call for consumer financial
education. The problem is that financial education is notoriously hard to do
well. And expenditures for it lead to strong positive externalities, so it is quite
difficult to induce market participants to offer financial education to the
borrowing public at anything like the scale it would take to matter.
These problems explain why disclosure laws are no substitute for CRA.
CRA gives strong incentives on banks and thrifts, those most able to alter their
behavior in response to the problem of information asymmetry and collective
action.308 CRA can enhance competition in fragmented markets where
disclosures seem unlikely on their own to significantly affect market structure.
CRA also enlists expert agencies to further its goals, rather than relying solely
on the public to change creditor behavior either in response to HMDA data or
one loan at a time through TILA disclosures.
D.
CRA COMPARED WITH ABUSIVE PRACTICE PROHIBITIONS
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HOEPA’s record has been decidedly mixed.309 Given the characteristics of
the lower-income consumer credit market—high demand from a population
with imperfect or limited credit history, many lightly regulated players and
little competition from mainstream lenders—the potential for abuses is ripe. A
Treasury-HUD report that I co-directed proposed a four-part approach to
curbing predatory lending: improve consumer literacy and disclosure, prohibit
harmful sales practices, restrict abusive terms and conditions, and improve
overall market structure.310 None of the legislative changes have been enacted,
but the Federal Reserve Board issued a rule addressing the harmful sales
practices and abusive terms often associated with high-cost mortgages using its
existing authority under HOEPA.311 This rule takes significant steps towards
limiting abusive practices, but congressional action would improve matters
further,312 The Board’s requirement that creditors document and verify a
borrower’s ability to repay will help deter asset-based lending.313 Rule
changes made in December 2001,314 under the Board’s HMDA authority,
complement its efforts on predatory lending by requiring disclosure of certain
rate spreads and of whether a loan exceeds HOEPA triggers.315 Many other
improvements to abusive practice regulation are possible, as states are
experimenting in this area and various cross-modal strategies have promise.
CRA could play an increasingly important role in reducing abuses. Banks
and thrifts can, and should, play an important role in improving competition in
the credit market for lower-income consumers. Low-income markets can be
profitable for banks,316 and recent census data confirm that minority and new
309
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immigrant communities will need to be a growing share of any bank’s
customer base. Banks can get ahead of the curve by moving more quickly and
creatively to serve central city markets where these growth populations tend to
live and work. Competition from banks and thrifts can help to drive out
abusive practices and improve price transparency in these markets. Lowincome borrowers may be ending up in a bank’s subprime unit or affiliate
when they could qualify for better terms. Banks and thrifts should have in
place procedures to “upstream” these borrowers with good credit histories into
their prime units. Regulators should give CRA consideration for “promoting”
borrowers from the subprime to the prime market. In this way CRA can help
thwart abuses in the subprime market without cutting off access to credit.
CRA has other advantages over HOEPA’s product regulation approach.
CRA covers all bank and thrift loans, not simply loans that are “high cost.”
CRA is designed to expand access to the full array of credit products, not
simply to weed out bad actors or discourage predatory lending. In addition,
HOEPA’s product regulation approach is more prescriptive than CRA. CRA
does not dictate that banks or thrifts provide or withdraw any particular loan
product or service, but leaves decisions about business strategy and product
design to the banks and thrifts. Lastly, unlike HOEPA, CRA attempts to bring
low-income households into the financial services mainstream.
E.
CRA COMPARED WITH SUBSIDIES
One alternative to CRA is to rely more on subsidies. In principle, subsidies
should be used “to make marginal private costs equal to marginal social costs,
and to make marginal benefits equal to marginal social benefits.”317 In
practice, this is hard to do. Substantively, it is hard to get private market actors
to respond to government subsidies unless the subsidies are robust. Politically,
it is hard to prevent the subsidies from becoming too robust. Subsidies are
pervasive in the home mortgage market.318 In this section, I focus only on the
GSEs and FHA as alternatives to CRA, while in Part VI I explore other,
hypothetical subsidies that could be deployed. With respect to Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the FHLBs, the subsidies are large in comparison to the
benefits accruing to low-income, moderate-income, and minority borrowers.
The GSEs benefit from their relationships with the federal government
in a variety of ways. They are exempt from state and local taxation,319 are
exempt from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration,320 can
317
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borrow from the Treasury,321 and issue debt that banks and thrifts can hold
under capital standards that favor the GSEs over private conduits.322 Unlike
privately issued securities,323 GSE securities are exempt from SEC
registration,324 are treated as government securities under the Exchange Act,325
and are exempt under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 and the Investment
Company Act of 1940.326 Most importantly, the GSEs benefit from the credit
enhancement of an implicit guarantee that the federal government will
intervene in the event of financial collapse.327 Despite the disclaimer by both
the federal government and the GSEs that there is no federal guarantee, there is
a general belief by the market to the contrary. That belief may arise because of
the GSEs’ congressional charters, the indicia of federal support, or the notion
that they are “too big to fail.” The implicit guarantee permits the GSEs to
issue debt at a lower cost, and to hold less capital than similar private firms.328
Measuring the subsidy provided to the GSEs is the subject of intense
debate. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that the benefits
accorded to the GSEs were worth $13.6 billion, of which Fannie Mae received
$6.1 billion, Freddie Mac $4.6 billion, and the FHLBs $3.0 billion.329 CBO
estimated that a “little more than half ($7.0 billion) of that total subsidy in
2000 passed through” to mortgage borrowers through lower interest rates on
conventional, conforming loans.330 CBO estimated that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac retained $3.9 billion (37 percent) of the subsidy for their
mortgage-backed securities under the 1933 Act. See STAFF REPORT: ENHANCING DISCLOSURE
MARKETS, A STAFF REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
DISCLOSURE
(2003),
available
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[hereinafter MBS DISCLOSURE REPORT].
321
CBO Study 2001, supra note 242, at 13-14.
322
Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 12 C.F.R. Pt. 3, Appendix A, §3(a)(2)(vi)-(viii).
323
Most privately issued MBS are sold in registered transactions. MBS DISCLOSURE REPORT,
supra note 320, at 25.
324
See 12 USC § 1723c (Fannie Mae) and 12 U.S.C. § 1455g (Freddie Mac). As government
securities, Ginnie Mae’s securities are also exempt. See section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (2000), and section 3(a)(12) of the Exchange Act, id.. § 78c(a)(12).
325
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(42)-(43) (2000).
326
Id.. § 77aaa-bbbb; id. § 80a-1 to 80a-64. GSE securities are subject to anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See id. § 77q(a); id. § 78j(b); 17 CFR § 240.10b5.
327
Congressional Budget Office, Assessing the Public Costs and Benefits of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac 10-11 (1996), at http://ftp.cbo.gov/0xx/doc13/Fanfred.pdf [hereinafter “CBO
Study 1996”].
328
See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF THE
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION AND THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
CORPORATION (July 11, 1996), at 3.
329
CBO Study 2001, supra note 242.
330
Id. at 1. CBO did not calculate the benefits of the affordable housing goals in determining
the net GSE subsidy. The GSEs’ public purposes go beyond access to credit for disadvantaged
borrowers, so I first use estimates of the net subsidy to the GSEs after accounting for such
broader purposes, and then discuss the affordable-housing mission of the GSEs.

IN THE MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURITIES

Credit Where It Counts

59

shareholders or other stakeholders.331 As for the FHLBs, CBO estimated that
they passed on only $300 million of their $3 billion subsidy to mortgage
borrowers, with 90 percent of the subsidy accruing to the benefit of the FHLB
member banks or reducing interest rates on other types of loans borrowed from
FHLB members.332 These estimates are sensitive to assumptions about the
funding advantages GSEs receive and about how to model the pass-through to
borrowers.333 For present purposes, the point estimates are not critical. I will
assume that the amount of the subsidy is some nontrivial amount above zero.
The GSEs contribute to access to home mortgage credit for low- and
moderate-income households. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s performance
has surpassed HUD’s affordable housing goals since they were first formally
promulgated in 1997,334 and HUD increased those goals for 2001-04,335 and
again for 2005-08.336 However, the share of GSE purchases financing
affordable housing under the goals lagged that of the primary market during
the 1990s.337 In the early 1990s, the GSEs held less of the credit risk
associated with lending to low-income or minority borrowers and areas than
did FHA and Ginnie Mae, as well as depository institutions, both as a share of
the GSEs’ own activities and as a share of the market.338 In addition to the
affordable housing goals, other factors contributed to this activity, such as the
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GSEs’ business strategies and the shift in the primary mortgage market
towards greater levels of lending to low-income borrowers.339
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have also contributed to affordable housing
in other ways. Both GSEs sponsor home counseling programs. The GSEs
train loan originators and support community organizations to increase
affordable lending. The GSEs have used more flexible underwriting criteria
for loan purchases. Greater flexibility in the secondary market can help to spur
greater flexibility in the primary market, but these innovations have also
occurred among home mortgage originators themselves.
The FHLBs also provide modest subsidies for affordable housing and
community development through the Affordable Housing Program and
Community Investment Program. However, the bank members of the FHLBs
enjoy extensive low-cost advances that essentially subsidize the full range of
bank activities.340 The FHLBs made $16.9 billion in net advances to members
in 2002, with $490 billion outstanding at the end of that year.341 In addition,
the FHLBs have begun to experiment with untargeted secondary market
operations in the hopes of competing with the other GSEs.
The GSEs pose risks and carry high costs. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
shareholders and FHLB members retain a significant portion of the subsidy,
and the portion passed on to consumers is spread diffusely through the market,
reaching many home buyers who would purchase a home in any event. The
FHLB subsidy is spread even more diffusely than that of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. The GSE duopoly hinders competition in the secondary market
for conventional, conforming loans, although the jumbo and subprime
secondary markets are thriving. Taxpayers would face a large, contingent
liability in the unlikely event that the GSEs failed. The large role of GSEs in
the debt market may raise the price of Treasury borrowing and squeeze credit
in other markets. Moreover, the government faces the difficulty of managing
risk from an implicit guarantee, rather than an explicit, budgeted one.342
FHA provides mortgage subsidies through insurance. FHA provided $157
billion in insurance on home mortgage loans to 1.3 million households in 2002.
FHA’s secondary market counterpart, Ginnie Mae, guaranteed $175 billion in
mortgage-backed securities that year. FHA specializes in serving borrowers
339
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who make “low down payment[s], have high debt-to-income ratios, and/or
have tarnished credit.”343 These borrowers tend to be first-time, minority, or
low-income and tend to live in low-income or minority-concentrated
neighborhoods.344 A higher share of FHA lending goes to low-income and
minority borrowers, and low-income areas, compared to the GSEs.345 During
the 1990s, the share of FHA lending going to low- and moderate-income
minority borrowers grew more rapidly than did the share of conventional
lending to those borrowers.346 FHA also serves a role in regional markets with
falling wages, increasing unemployment, and dropping house prices.347 At
times, FHA has competed with conventional lenders.348 A dilemma for FHA is
how to reach further into the market while managing risk.349 As the
conventional market serves the more credit-worthy portion of FHA’s pool of
borrowers,350 adverse selection will leave FHA with higher risk. That problem
is exacerbated because FHA lags the private sector in credit scoring and risk
management.351 The FHA portfolio is becoming riskier.352
In sum, government subsidies generate windfalls for the GSE shareholders
and others. A large portion of those whose mortgages are purchased by the
GSEs would likely have had access to the credit markets in any event, even if
at a higher price. GSE subsidies are not transparent, making it difficult for the
public to weigh its costs and benefits. FHA subsidies are more transparent
because the cost of the subsidy appears as user fees and as an item in the
federal budget.353 The cost of transparency is, however, direct taxpayer
liability for the FHA. FHA may not have the management capacity and
technical expertise to manage risk as effectively as private market participants.
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CRA has important advantages over existing subsidy approaches.
Needless to say, CRA provides no windfall to banks and thrifts. CRA targets
all its efforts at expanding access to credit and financial services for low- and
moderate-income borrowers and communities, so there is no wasted effort on
generalized policies subsidizing housing consumption. CRA is less risky than
subsidies through GSEs or FHA. If CRA increased risk because of expanded
lending to low-income borrowers, that risk would be diffused over the well
diversified portfolios of thousands of depositories, all of which are
comprehensively supervised for safety and soundness and required to hold
adequate capital. Moreover, banks and thrifts have expertise in finding
creditworthy borrowers and in using extensive risk-mitigation techniques that
are more difficult for secondary market participants to operate. It is certainly
possible to design subsidies far better than the ones we have, but our
experience over the last 70 years should augur caution.
VI.
CRA COMPARED WITH OTHER ALTERNATIVES
Critics have argued for a range of other policy alternatives to CRA. The
previous Part compared CRA with existing legal regimes of negative
prohibition (ECOA), disclosure (HMDA and TILA), product regulation
(HOEPA), and subsidy (through the GSEs and FHA). This Part compares
CRA with ideal types of alternative arrangements that have been suggested by
critics, including income transfers or demand-side subsidies, supply-side
subsidies, and rules as compared with CRA’s standards. I contend that
alternative institutional arrangements to CRA, including relying solely on the
market, would likely produce inferior outcomes or be quite costly in transition.
A.
CRA COMPARED WITH INCOME TRANSFERS OR DEMAND-SIDE
SUBSIDIES
Assume for the moment that the purpose of credit market regulation is to
redistribute “something” to the poor so that afterwards their social welfare is
higher. The public finance literature usually assumes that income is a good
proxy for social welfare, and that the “something” being redistributed should
thus be income. That income redistribution should be confined to the tax and
transfer system and should not be a goal of legal rules is a familiar assertion in
public finance, and with good reason. At least in principle, income transfer
can usually be accomplished at lower cost than if redistribution were
accomplished by changing legal rules. Kaplow and Shavell take the strong
form of this argument, contending that legal rules should never take account of
distributional consequences and should only aim for efficiency.354
354

See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the
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Macey and Miller argue that CRA could be characterized as a tax on banks
and thrifts aimed at redistribution and thatincome transfers should be preferred
in accomplishing this goal.355 CRA is not, at least not explicitly, aimed at
redistribution, but rather at correcting perceived market failures. Even if the
goal of CRA were to be recast as income redistribution, it is not obvious that
the tax-and-transfer system should be preferred over CRA. One may want to
use legal rules in place of transfers because income taxation is itself
distortionary,356 and income transfers may have high administrative costs.357
If income is transferred as an in-kind subsidy the costs may be higher than
through “cash” transfers—or even through legal rules.358 First, in-kind
subsidies are considered less efficient than cash subsidies because the recipient
may only use the in-kind subsidy for specified purposes.359 To the extent that
the recipient undertakes the specified actions to the same degree as if given a
cash grant, the in-kind subsidy costs more to administer. To the extent that the
subsidy changes behavior, the subsidy does not increase the recipient’s welfare
to the same degree as if she had received a cash subsidy to pursue her own
preferences.
Second, in-kind plans are paternalistic in telling the
heterogeneous recipients that they should derive utility from the provision of a
particular service.360 In-kind mechanisms may impose a higher value on a
service than an individual may have given it. Third, in-kind programs are
often more administratively costly than direct transfers.361
Nor is transferring income as “cash” without controversy. There is no
consensus on the appropriate distribution of income. Moreover, even if one
were to decide how much income to redistribute, the means are contentious.
The inefficiencies associated with the welfare system are well known.362
Similarly, the literature debating tax expenditures is voluminous.363
include programs that transfer income to the poor) to redistribute income.” Kaplow & Shavell,
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Furthermore, the distinction between tax and transfer programs and regulations
is not obviously meaningful conceptually,and questions about program design,
regulatory structure, and the appropriate incidence of the tax—whether on
banks or other taxpayers— in relation to the tax structure generally, would all
remain.364 In addition, transition costs from laws that redistribute income to a
tax and transfer program would diminish the benefits of such a change.
If the main goal of CRA were to redistribute income, as a theoretical
matter it seems more desirable and efficient simply to eliminate CRA and other
credit market regulation and subsidies and to shift to a much more progressive
income tax. If regulations and subsidies are intrinsically inefficient and also
distort the work-leisure tradeoff, and one assumes away transition costs and the
political difficulty of the task, then income redistribution through significant
expansion of the tax and transfer programs may be preferable.365 But all these
conditions seem unlikely to hold in the real world.
One could also think of credit market regulation as about redistributing not
income, but access to credit.366 Suppose that society seeks neither to correct
market imperfections, nor to guard against discrimination, nor to redistribute
income, but instead to redistribute access to credit to low- and moderateincome and minority households. Why would society have this goal?
Redistribution of home mortgage credit might advance a goal of spreading the
positive externalities associated with owning a home.367 Redistribution of
mortgage credit would also have “expressive” value,368 by conveying that lowincome and minority households are full members of our society because they
can participate in the “American dream” of home ownership.
If this is the intended form of redistribution, then CRA may be more
efficient than income redistribution. Income is, after all, only a proxy for
social welfare. Directly redistributing the thing that society wishes to
redistribute may be less costly than using income redistribution to achieve the
same aim. Society may have to redistribute a large sum of income to
underserved borrowers to induce the credit markets to leave them as well off as
they are with current regulations and subsidies. Moreover, it would be hard to
convey the same “expressive” effect regarding inclusion in the American
A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83
HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986).
364
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367
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368
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dream through income redistribution if some aspect of the difficulty these
households have in accessing credit markets is not solely due to their income.
For example, if racial discrimination, market failures, lack of wealth, poor
credit history, or neighborhood racial or income characteristics are factors,
then income redistribution alone would likely be inadequate to address them.
The broader point is that CRA is not primarily justified by redistributive
goals, but by the need to address market failures and discrimination. It would
be highly inefficient to attempt to redress these market failures by increasing
the incomes of millions of individuals, regardless of whether they attempt to
access the home mortgage market and regardless of whether they would
experience barriers to credit from market failures or racial discrimination.
B.
CRA COMPARED WITH SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSIDIES
At some level, subsidies can become substitutes for regulation. If the
government pays private sector participants a sufficient amount, for example,
they will take a second look for creditworthy borrowers in low-income,
moderate-income, or minority communities in the same way that they would
under a regulatory regime. Developing such a subsidy regime is not without
difficulties. First, one would need to decide whether the particular market
participants or taxpayers should bear the cost of addressing the market failure.
Second, one would need to determine the amount of subsidy necessary to have
the desired effect without generating undesirable windfalls to recipients.
With respect to the former issue, for example, if lenders practicing
statistical discrimination are paid sufficiently, presumably they would be
willing to stop engaging in that form of discrimination. The question is
whether we as a society think that private market participants should be
permitted to engage in “rational’ discrimination. In that area, ECOA bars
statistical discrimination. That is, we prohibit discrimination even if it is
“rational” and we do not think taxpayers should have to pay to stop market
participants from employing statistical discrimination on a prohibited basis.
Presumably, society would have an even greater aversion to subsidizing
institutions to get them to stop discriminating on the basis of racial animus.
With respect to the latter issue, subsidies to financial institutions for
lending in low-income communities could be expanded, but previous
experience, documented in Part V, suggests that windfalls would be difficult
to control. In addition to subsidies to banks and thrifts more generally,
targeted subsidies to specialized lenders can be an important means of
expanding the reach of the private lenders.
For example, the Treasury Department’s Community Development
Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund, established in 1994,369 is designed to
create a national network of financial institutions focused on low-income
communities. The CDFI Fund has provided over $535 million to locally
based, private sector CDFIs, as well as mainstream banks and thrifts. These
369
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local CDFIs have a strong track record of producing tangible results.370 For
example, Self-Help Credit Union of North Carolina has provided over $1
billion in financing to 16,000 home buyers, small businesses and non-profits in
North Carolina. The Reinvestment Fund, serving the Philadelphia region, has
made $200 million in loans, investments and grants and leveraged an
additional $800 million in public and private capital for affordable housing and
community development. The Reinvestment Fund has helped to build 6,000
units of affordable housing, to create 16,000 jobs, provide 6,000 new child care
slots, and build numerous new community facilities.
CDFIs around the country are helping to transform low- and moderateincome neighborhoods. They are drawing in mainstream banks and thrifts to
invest with them. CDFIs are often the market pioneers in their community,
using their local market expertise and knowledge about the community to
make loans and investments others had overlooked. The CDFI Fund has
played a critical role in growing this industry. The Fund’s investments have
helped its awardees to increase their capitalization, develop stronger
infrastructure and operations, and expand their reach.371 The growth of CDFIs
is critically important to expanding lending in low-income communities, and I
worked hard at the Treasury Department to grow this field.
However, the small size and scale of these CDFIs suggests that it would be
inefficient to switch from relying on the banking system to a system based
solely on such specialized lenders.372 Moreover, without the impetus of CRA,
it is doubtful that banks and thrifts would have invested so heavily in CDFIs
over the last decade. Eliminating CRA in favor of CDFIs would thus require
an even greater infusion of governmental funds to continue CDFI growth, and
CDFIs might also lose out on the technical expertise, business judgment, and
advice that banks have brought to the table over the last decade. In addition,
there would be enormous costs to shift to a system of targeted subsidy.
More serious objections could be made to switching to a system in which
the government delivers the benefit directly, creating a need for a government
loan distribution system parallel to the banking sector. Not only would the
transition costs be enormous, but the government would probably do badly at
providing financial services in this way. Even if the government were good at
it, such services would unfairly compete with the private sector.
370
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C.

CRA’S STANDARDS APPROACH COMPARED TO A RULES
APPROACH
The CRA statute, and its implementing regulations, can be characterized as
employing a legal standard, rather than a rule. Schlag defines rules as having
an “empirical” trigger and a “determined” response while standards are defined
as having an “evaluative” trigger and a “guided” response.373 The CRA statute
directs the banking agencies to “assess the institution’s record of meeting the
credit needs of its entire community…” and to “take such record into account”
in evaluating applications for mergers, acquisitions, branch openings and
closings.374 The structure of the agencies’ responsibilities under the statute is
evaluative and guided rather than determined. Under the regulations, a bank’s
or thrift’s “performance under the tests and standards in the rule is judged in
the context of information about the institution, its community, its competitors,
and its peers.”375 That is, bank regulators provide no fixed requirement for
banks to undertake a certain level of activity, but rather make a judgment about
the institution’s performance in the context in which it is operating.
The debate over whether standards or rules should be preferred has a long
pedigree.376 Three basic approaches emerge in this debate. First, scholars
have identified philosophical underpinning of rules and standards.377 Second,
other scholars have rejected the notion that formal distinctions between rules
and standards have any meaning.378 A third group of scholars have attempted
to discern general principles for deciding when standards or rules are more
appropriate.379 Among the last group, law and economics scholars have used
transaction cost economics to argue that the higher cost of articulating rules ex
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ante is worth it when large numbers of people engage in the activity being
regulated, multiplying the transaction costs many times over.380
Critics of CRA have argued that its standards approach results in arbitrary
and inefficient enforcement, permits rent-seeking by banking agencies and
community groups, and violates basic notions of the rule of law.381 CRA’s
critics tend to espouse rhetoric that would support the notion that deep
philosophical differences underlie the distinction between rules and standards,
but the anti-formalists are right that standards can be made to look like rules,
and vice versa, undermining the importance of such a gulf. Legal directives
can take forms arrayed on a continuum from those that are more standard-like
to those that are more rule-like. Thus, for the purposes of analyzing CRA, I
adopt a pragmatic approach, and ask whether something like the standards
approach of CRA is preferable to a more rules-based approach in this area.
Translating transaction cost theory into application is difficult because it is
hard to measure the costs and benefits of alternative rule and standards
formulations. Kaplow argues that after promulgation, standards increase
transaction costs relative to rules. The lack of certainty in standards for
meeting community needs under CRA does have compliance costs. Lacking a
numerical target imposed by regulators makes it more difficult for firms to
know whether their CRA initiatives will result in the rating they seek. Firms
may “overcomply” with CRA, particularly given the social norm of
disapprobation that accompanies a low rating.382 Each examiner may review
bank performance using implicitly different standards, leading to inconsistent
evaluations even by a single regulator. Examiners may vary in their standards
across regulators and regions, magnifying the likelihood of inconsistency.
Nonetheless, there are strong reasons for preferring a standard to a rule for
CRA. First, a standard is likely to be more efficient than a rule. Kaplow
suggests that the cost of rulemaking will be higher ex ante than the cost of
developing a standard. How much higher will depend in part on how detailed
the rule must be to cover the array of factual situations in which it is supposed
to apply. It would be quite costly to come up with a rule for CRA that was
nuanced enough to fit the myriad contexts in which financial institutions lend.
One would want to adjust for: local market conditions; competition; the
structure of the local housing market; the presence or absence of community
organizations helping with screening and educating potential borrowers; the
strength of local homeowners and civic organizations; local, state and federal
funds available for homeownership assistance; the particular characteristics of
380
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the bank or thrift; and other factors. Delineating these factors in advance
would be enormously costly, with a high chance of getting them wrong.
To lower costs ex ante, one could adopt a simple set of rules instead. One
might imagine a system that involved levying fines on banks for failure to
comply with numerical lending targets. Setting fines for violations of CRA
would comport CRA enforcement more closely with other areas of bank
regulation. In the 1990s regulatory reform process, the regulators considered
including fines for banks achieving only a “needs to improve” rating on their
examination, but dropped the idea, in part because the Department of Justice
opined that such fines were not authorized by the statute.383
Yet CRA’s contextual standard has significant advantages ex post over an
approach with fines for violating rules. Clear, quantitative requirements on all
firms would be inefficient. Different firms have different cost structures, scope
and scale, and operate in markets with different demographics and competitive
structures. Firms make loans at different times under different market
conditions. Setting a single rate (or rates) of lending in advance would likely
cause some firms to be unable to meet the standard despite their best efforts,
cause others to make uneconomic loans, and cause still others to meet the rule
without any serious effort to lend to low-income borrowers. By contrast, the
CRA standards permit banks to respond to local needs based on their own
institutional organization, market assessments, and business plans, without
being judged on the basis of national norms. Rather, examiners look to local
context and business strategy. Standards also diminish the extent to which
regulators need fear that CRA would lead to “credit allocation,” since the bank
makes the judgment about whether, and to whom, to extend a loan.384
A second reason to prefer a CRA standard over a rule is that using
standards permits banks and local communities to participate in the formation
of the legal directive. Banks subject to CRA help to shape the content of the
383
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standard, not merely through the notice and comment rulemaking process, but
also in CRA’s application to their local context. CRA enforcement through
public disclosure, rating the institution’s performance, and taking public input
also permit greater citizen participation in the decision about application of the
rule. This enhances local organizations that in turn improve the potential
performance of loans made in their community. While public involvement
adds to the transaction costs of CRA enforcement, these benefits of civic
engagement should be weighed also. This kind of “bottom-up” form of lawmaking can have important advantages over clear rules.385
CRA may be characterized as a form of output regulation but without any
numerical target. Compared with input regulation, for example, requiring
certain kinds of underwriting, this type of output regulation provides for
greater flexibility and enhances rather than stifles innovation. Output
regulation, increasingly favored in the environmental protection context, can
be more efficient than input regulation because it lets firms choose how to
shape conduct to meet output requirements.386 CRA lacks numerical
requirements normally associated with output regulation. The lack of certainty
can put enormous strain on regulatory discretion and add costs. Yet it has the
advantage of letting banks, as well as their local communities, have a say in the
manner in which bank performance will be judged. This increases the
likelihood that the performance will be judged according to an appropriate
standard for the institution and the local market context.
Third, some of the down sides generally associated with standards, such as
arbitrary and unaccountable decision-making and agency rent -seeking, are
mitigated in the case of CRA. The regulator’s CRA review becomes public
and so can be subjected to analysis. The review includes notice and comment
proceedings, often with the opportunity for hearings, which enhances
transparency and permits all affected parties to provide input. Regulators,
community organizations, and banks and thrifts have repeated interactions over
time on the same issues, unlike parties who appear before a judge only once.
These factors increase accountability and minimize the opportunities for abuse.
Fourth, the form of a legal directive as a standard rather than a rule conveys
social meaning and affects enforcement.387 Examples from other credit market
regulation may help to elucidate the point. ECOA’s rule that statistical
discrimination is prohibited, as opposed to a rule that subsidized creditors for
deciding not to engage in such discrimination, is based on our deeply rooted
sense that distinctions based on race, even if “rational” in the short run, are
wrong. Thus the law prohibits the conduct rather than subsidizing adherence
to the rule. Social meaning attaches to other forms of regulation even in areas
that are less deeply felt. For example, ambivalence about the desirability of
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high-cost lending can be conveyed by HOEPA’s simultaneous requirement of
additional disclosures and restrictions on loan terms without any usury cap or
other stringent provisions that would effectively bar such lending.
The form of the legal directive also can enhance compliance because the
law helps to create social norms and to reveal instances in which actors
transgress those norms. For example, HMDA contains no substantive legal
rule, but reveals information about the extent to which creditors may be falling
short of meeting the credit needs of minorities or low- and moderate-income
communities. Even if no enforcement action is taken under ECOA, and even if
no mergers are denied under CRA, HMDA data can change creditor behavior.
That may be so because the public cares, in general, about the social norm of
equal access to credit, and because the creditors care about their reputation
with the public. Of course, the social norm may push behavior beyond what is
efficient or fall short of what was intended by the promulgators of the standard.
CRA’s broad standards and “enforcement” mechanisms—public disclosure
of examination results and consideration of the institution’s CRA performance
during merger applications—have long been derided by both proponents and
detractors of CRA. Community advocates urge stricter rules and harsher
consequences of failure. Bankers lament the lack of clear rules or safe harbors
and the intrusive role of the public. Yet it is this interplay, this conversation,
between banks and communities that is one of CRA’s chief virtues. A rule
setting forth lending requirements would cut off this dialogue. It would also
send a message that banks are to disregard creditworthiness, business strategy,
and local context, which is not the goal of CRA. In this respect, CRA’s legal
directive appropriately takes the form of a standard rather than a rule.
CRA’s broad standard expresses the value of inclusion in lending. Because
interpretation of CRA’s standard requires community input, CRA expresses an
inclusive ideal of participation in rule making that should be counted among
the law’s benefits. The expressive effects of law should be considered
alongside the operational effects.388 Even welfare economists acknowledge
that expressive factors, like other non-consequentialist factors, may be
included in concepts of utility or well-being that aggregate to social welfare.389
Thus, under either an expressive or a utilitarian theory of value, to the extent
that CRA’s norms of inclusion resonate with low-income, moderate-income,
and minority borrowers, such expression ought to be regarded as a benefit of
CRA. CRA conveys that borrowers who have been left out of the economic
mainstream ought to be treated with respect by lenders and regulators alike.
This expressive function of CRA can bring real benefits, as attested to by
members of these communities.
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VII. POLICY REFORMS
The banking agencies issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPR) in 2001 seeking input on what changes should be made to CRA.390
After a long review, the proposed rule was issued in February 2004.391 The
agencies left the existing CRA regulations largely in place, but significantly
expanded the scope of institutions defined as “small” under the rule and
therefore subject to only a streamlined lending test, rather than a full-scope
CRA review. The agencies also specified that CRA examinations would
consider evidence of certain illegal or abusive credit practices. In July, 2004,
the agencies abruptly withdrew the proposal,392 when the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) announced that it would unilaterally raise the small bank
threshold to $1 billion.393 Indications are that the FDIC will quickly follow
suit, while the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC have declined to do so.394
Meanwhile, Congress is considering whether to reform CRA.395
In my view, the Board and the OCC were correct to be cautious about
revising the CRA regulations at this time, and the OTS and FDIC were wrong
to unilaterally raise the threshold. I first discuss the general reasons for
maintaining CRA’s basic framework, and explain why raising the small bank
threshold is ill-conceived. I then turn to policy reforms that could deepen
CRA’s effectiveness while increasing flexibility for banks.
A.
MAINTAIN CRA’S BASIC FRAMEWORK
1. General Considerations
First, despite problems with aspects of implementation, the regulations
have worked exceedingly well in expanding access to credit—far more so than
any involved in the 1995 revisions could have expected. As I have
documented, CRA has significantly expanded access to credit. The Board’s
study suggests that this significant expansion of credit has come at a relatively
modest cost, if any, in terms of performance and profitability.
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Second, the costs to banks, and to the agencies, of changing the regulations
could be high.396 It has taken quite some time for banks and the agencies to
work through complicated interpretive issues, operational and information
system problems, and, perhaps most importantly, the training of bank
employees and agency examination staff. Community-based organizations,
state and local governments, and other bank partners have organized their
community development activities in response, to some degree, to the current
structure of CRA. New regulations might necessitate changes in those
activities, with high transition costs. The start-up costs associated with
changes in regulations account for a significant part of compliancecosts. 397
Third, current economic uncertainties present complex problems for banks
and serious hardships for the most vulnerable households. Now may not be the
most opportune time to re-examine basic rules governing bank performance in
serving the needs of low- and moderate-income households and communities.
2. Retain the Current Definition of Small Banks
The agencies proposed to increase the asset level at which institutions are
considered “small” under CRA. Currently, banks and thrifts are small if they
have assets of $250 million or less, and are independent or are part of a holding
company with under $1 billion in bank and thrift assets. Under the proposal,
banks and thrifts would be considered small if they have assets under $500
million, whether independent or affiliated with a holding company of any size.
While the proposal would not have a major effect on the percentage of assets
in institutions considered large, the proposal would have cut in half the number
of institutions subject to the large retail institution test, reducing coverage of
full-scope CRA review to about eleven percent of all banks and thrifts.
With respect to the threshold, the agencies presented little evidence that
banks between $250 and $500 million faced special burdens from the fullscope review. If such particular burdens exist, it would be better to deal with
them through modifications of the investment and services tests, rather than
eliminate the tests for those firms entirely. Regulators have the authority to be
flexible on the investment test.398 As for the service test, small institutions
often have a comparative advantage in providing retail services tailored to their
local communities. These services are often vital to low- and moderateincome households, partly because such services are gateways to access to
credit. Because there is little justification for not applying a service test to
small banks it seems all the more ill-advised to expand the category of
institutions not subject to the test. Lastly, smaller institutions often have a
396
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comparative advantage in relationship lending to small businesses.399 Thus, it
makes little sense to avoid collecting small business data and evaluating
institutions on their small-business-lending performance.
Even more problematic is the proposal to ignore the asset size of the
holding company when determining whether to consider the bank “small.”
This is so for two main reasons. First, banks within holding companies that
have less than $500 million in assets are less in need of regulatory “burden
relief” than similarly sized independent institutions. Holding companies
provide scale economies to their subsidiaries in complying with bank
regulations.400 Banks that are part of holding companies face lower regulatory
burdens from the same regulation than their non-affiliated counterparts of
similar size. Thus, affiliation should generally be weighed, not ignored, in
determining tradeoffs between regulatory burdens and benefits.
Second, banks that are part of holding companies have available to them
the range of expertise of the holding company, which is useful for developing
programs to meet community needs under CRA. The holding company is part
of the bank’s performance context. Along with its subsidiaries, it can offer a
range of services to the bank in helping the bank meet its CRA performance
goals, such as innovative loan products, securitization, or expertise in
investment and other matters. These affiliates do affect a bank’s CRA
performance, and the bank should therefore be assessed using the CRA test for
large retail institutions which includes the investment and service tests and
which takes account of the expertise and resources of the parent institution.
For these reasons, the agencies were correct to withdraw the joint rule
increasing the small bank asset thresholds, and the FDIC and OTS were wrong
to pursue even higher thresholds unilaterally. Under the FDIC and OTS plans,
banks and thrifts with less than $1 billion in assets, regardless of holding
company affiliation, would be considered “small” for purposes of CRA. The
OTS plan would exempt over 800 thrifts—88 percent of all thrifts holding over
$160 billion in assets, with 15 percent of total thrift assets—from the CRA
large bank retail examinations.401 The FDIC plan would exempt over 4,600
FDIC-supervised banks and thrifts—over 86 percent of FDIC-supervised
institutions, with $640 billion in assets.402
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B.
COMBAT PREDATORY LENDING
The ANPR had asked if agencies should consider whether loans made are
harmful or abusive. The agencies began to address this issue in the
interagency questions and answers issued in 2001.403 Under that approach,
examiners are directed to take account of certain unlawful loan practices. In
addition, examiners are to take note of programs designed to transition
borrowers from high cost loans to lower cost loans. Over the last decade,
affiliations between insured depository institutions and non-bank subprime
specialists have increased. Thus, the effectiveness of the agencies’ approach
will depend on adequate supervision of the relationship between the bank and
its affiliates to assess whether borrowers with good credit history are
“upstreamed” from subprime affiliates and offered prime products; whether
borrowers with poor credit histories have an opportunity to demonstrate
creditworthiness and move into prime products; and whether borrowers are
inappropriately steered to higher-cost products or divisions. The principles set
forth in the interagency questions and answers will need support from agency
examinations extending beyond the bank or thrift itself.
The Proposed Rule was much narrower. The agencies would have only
taken account of illegal credit practices in affiliates that the bank or thrift chose
to include in its CRA record. Affiliates engaged in unlawful practices but not
included by the bank or thrift in its CRA submission would not be considered
in evaluating the bank’s performance under CRA. Moreover, the proposal
focused on only one particular form of abuse—“asset based lending”—to the
exclusion of other predatory practices. Focusing solely on asset-based lending
would have sent a message that other abuses would not affect an institution’s
CRA rating. Thus, the agencies were correct to withdraw this proposal.
The ANPR does not ask, but should, whether consumer loans should play a
more central role in CRA examinations. Currently, such loans are only
considered at the option of the bank, or in cases where consumer lending
constitutes a core feature of the depository’s lending activities. As evidenced
by the rise of non-bank consumer lending in low-income communities, some
low-income individuals have consumer credit needs that are not being met by
banks. Greater competition in the consumer market might help drive out sharp
practices. The agencies should consider ways of encouraging banks to assess
how their consumer lending could contribute to meeting CRA obligations.
C.
ENHANCE THE INVESTMENT AND SERVICE TESTS
The balance among the lending, service, and investment tests set forth in
the preamble to the 1995 rule has worked well. Lending has rightly been the
focus of a statute aimed at the “credit needs” of communities, but the
investment and service tests play critical roles as well. Investments help
expand access to credit by enhancing the capacity of specialized local lenders
403
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such as CDFIs to provide credit, and by stabilizing a local community with
direct investment, thereby enabling loans to be made in the community in a
more safe and sound manner. The importance of services to the provision of
credit has been less well understood in the past, but recent research shows that
services also play a critical role in expanding access to credit.404
1. Investment Test
Investments help banks to meet the credit needs of low- and moderateincome communities. Investments help build local financial and community
infrastructure and stabilize and grow the broader economic base of low- and
moderate-income communities. The interagency questions and answers
provide appropriate flexibility for examiners to consider investments made
outside of an institution’s assessment area if the needs of its community are
adequately served. With such flexibility, participation in a broad range of
investment options are available in today’s marketplace even for reasonably
small firms. Based on anecdotal evidence, examiners may not be fully using
existing flexibilities, and institutions may not be taking advantage of the full
range of investment options. Additional examiner guidance about investments
should encourage examiners to provide greater weight to innovative
investments (for example, investments in CDFIs) than to larger-volume, lowrisk investments (for example, standard mortgage-backed securities).405
The ANPR asks what weight should be given to originated loans,
purchased loans, and asset-backed securities of CRA-qualifying loans. The
current regulation treats loans originated and purchased the same, and assetbacked securities as investments. In principle, one could measure, regardless
of the structure, who bears the origination cost, the servicing cost, and the
credit risk; quantify such factors as a percentage of the loan; and then assign a
portion of each loan corresponding to each bank’s share. In practice, the
expense is highly unlikely to make the effort worthwhile. Banks should be
able to provide examiners with information about their business strategy, and
to allocate securities to the investment or lending test according to that
strategy. Examiners could make qualitative judgments about the extent to
which the firm is serving credit needs however the activity is categorized .
2. Service Test
The provision of financial services is critical to meeting the credit needs of
low- and moderate-income communities. Low-income individuals with bank
accounts have better access to, and pay less for, transaction services, shortterm consumer loans, small business loans, and home mortgage loans. Access
to an appropriate bank account, for most low-income “unbanked” individuals,
404
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would mean lower transaction costs, greater consumer protection, more access
to loans, and increased savings as a cushion against financial emergency.406
The 1995 regulations provide sufficient flexibility for analysis of an
institution’s performance, but agency examination procedures do not provide
enough guidance as to how to measure an institution’s activities in ways that
matter to low-income consumers. The service test has received perfunctory
attention from examiners,407 with public evaluations containing little analysis
of whether low-income consumers use bank services. Examinations under the
service test could be vastly improved by taking three steps.
First, examiners should evaluate the extent to which institutions offer lowcost accounts designed to meet the needs of low-income individuals. Low-cost
electronic accounts with direct deposit, little or no risk of overdraft, the
opportunity for the accumulation of savings, and bill payment or electronic
money order, may hold special promise in this regard. Examiners should make
a qualitative judgment about the institutions’ products, taking into account
research into low-income consumer needs, the costs to institutions of providing
accounts, and the requirements of sound banking practice.
Second, regulators should evaluate banks based on the number of low- and
moderate-income account holders at their institution. Quantitative measures of
usage should provide a portrait of an institution’s performance under the
service test, and data collection on the numbers of accounts provided should
not in and of itself be burdensome.408
Third, and conversely, the agencies should give negative consideration to
activities that undermine the provision of quality services to the poor. For
example, participation by banks in arrangements with other parties that do not
provide adequate consumer protection or raise compliance, operational, or
other risks should receive negative consideration as part of the performance
context under the service test. Agencies should ensure that banks are not
406
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merely “renting” their charters to these firms, but are engaged in monitoring
and supervision to ensure compliance with applicable law. This may require
targeted, risk-based examination of these parties, as has been conducted by the
OCC with respect to national bank relationships with payday lenders.
D.
RELY MORE ON FLEXIBLE APPROACHES
1. Provide Guidance on Qualitative Factors
The ANPR had asked whether the regulations strike the right balance
between qualitative and quantitative factors, and among lending, investment
and service tests. As Board stated in its Proposed Rule, in theory, the
regulation itself is flexible on both counts. In practice, qualitative factors are
more difficult to evaluate, which in examinations tends to diminish their
importance. The regulations’ focus on actual performance has largely worked
in increasing lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas. The
challenge now is to preserve those gains in focusing on measurable results,
while integrating quality concerns into examinations. Without changing the
regulations, the agencies could provide examiners with more detailed
guidance, which will tend to raise the quality of the qualitative analysis over
time. For example, the current interagency questions and answers note that
institutions would receive favorable consideration for instituting programs that
graduate borrowers from the subprime to the prime market. It may be useful to
provide examiners with tools to assess how the presence of such a program
affects the ability of a bank or thrift to meet the credit needs of its community.
2. Develop the Strategic Plan Option
The strategic plan option represents, in principle, an important alternative
method of evaluation, particularly for firms with non-traditional business plans
and operations. In fact, the strategic plan option is likely to become more
important over time, as firms use an increasingly wide variety of means—
including the internet, ATMs and POS, interstate and global branches—to
collect deposits, make loans and investments, and provide services. Firms are
increasingly meeting the credit needs of communities through a variety of
affiliates. The fact that so few firms have used the strategic plan option argues
strongly for the need to make the option easier to exercise, in part by providing
assistance in development, speeding up review, and providing greater certainty
and speed in examination of firms that have adopted such plans.
3. Broaden the Performance Context
The flexibility provided by the performance context assessment is one of
the most critical aspects of the CRA regulation. It permits the locally based
decisionmaking contemplated by Congress in enacting CRA. The performance
context permits financial institutions to respond to local needs based on their
own institutional organization and business plan, without being judged on the
basis of national norms. Examiners instead look to local context and the
business strategy of the bank or thrift. The performance context also permits
greater citizen participation in the formulation of the assessment, which may
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increase its accuracy and perceived legitimacy. The performance context also
gives examiners the opportunity to evaluate the extent to which the bank’s or
thrift’s relationships with affiliates or third parties enhances or diminishes the
ability of the depository to meet the credit needs of its community. Based on a
non-scientific review of a number of public evaluations from examinations of
large banks, however, examiners could benefit from additional training and
education in more clearly linking an understanding of performance context
with an assessment of performance. Moreover, examiners should explicitly
look to affiliates and subsidiaries in the holding company structure for an
understanding of the bank’s capacity to perform under CRA.
4. Allow More Flexibility in Assessment Area
Assessment areas, which are tied to geographies surrounding depositgathering facilities, provide a reasonable standard for most institutions.
However, in an era in which banks collect deposits, raise funds, and make
loans across states, national borders, and over the internet, “community” will
need redefinition. A more tailored approach might permit institutions to define
more broadly their own low- and moderate-income target markets or
emphasize different product and geographic markets in different contexts, with
strong anti-gerrymandering protections. For example, a bank might compete
with non-bank lenders to make affordable loans to subprime borrowers in areas
where it has no branches, rather than emphasizing prime loans in a tight market
where it does have branches. Adopting a more flexible approach to assessment
areas is more complicated for the agencies to administer, and in some ways
riskier for banks and community organizations, than the current approach.
Nonetheless, CRA will need to evolve with the marketplace to remain
effective. A prudent course is for the agencies to experiment with a flexible
approach to delineating assessment areas in the strategic plan option.
E.
MONITOR AFFILIATE ACTIVITY
As financial institutions increasingly rely on a broad range of affiliations to
carry on their businesses, it is both possible and desirable to take account of
affiliate activity while respecting the fact that CRA applies only to insured
depositories. Permitting banks, at their option, to include activities of affiliates
in meeting the credit needs of their community, with current safeguards against
gerrymandering, is consistent with this approach. It is also critical to an
accurate measure of CRA performance. Some borrowers may be ending up in
a bank’s subprime unit, or subprime affiliate, when in fact they could qualify
for a mortgage on better terms. Banks and thrifts should have in place
procedures to “upstream” these borrowers with good credit histories into their
prime mortgage units. The regulators should give CRA consideration for
“promoting” borrowers from the subprime to the prime market.
Moreover, the other agencies should adopt the current approach of the
OCC, which considers a bank’s subsidiaries’ assets in determining the
performance context in which a bank operates. The assets and activities of all
of the affiliates of a bank should also be considered in assessing the
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performance context within which a bank meets its obligations under CRA.
After all, a bank’s affiliates are hardly irrelevant to the bank’s business
decisions, including how to meet the credit needs of their communities. The
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act made a financial holding company’s
commencement of newly authorized activities, or its merger with newly
authorized entities, contingent on satisfactory CRA performance by all of the
affiliate banks or thrifts. A bank’s affiliates have a strong interest in ensuring
adequate CRA performance by all the insured depositories of the holding
company. The agencies should include the assets and activities of affiliates in
assessing performance context for CRA examinations of banks and thrifts.
Finally, CRA regulations already provide that evidence of illegal credit
practices will affect an institution’s CRA rating. The laws governing such
credit practices are equally applicable to banks and thrifts and non-depository
creditors. Illegal credit practices of an affiliate that has been included at the
option of the depository institution for purposes of a CRA examination are
relevant to its rating, but so too are the illegal credit practices of affiliates not
so included. Regulators should not turn a blind eye to illegal practices. Given
the high cost of examining all affiliates for such practices, enforcement of
other credit laws should occur through risk- based examinations of affiliates.
The results of such compliance examinations should be taken into account in
understanding the performance context of affiliates under CRA.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Enormous progress has been made over the last decade in expanding access
to credit for low-income, moderate-income, and minority households.
Contrary to the contentions of previous legal scholarship, I have argued that
CRA effectively responds to important market failures and helps to address
racial discrimination. Using recent empirical evidence, I have shown that CRA
has helped to expand access to credit to low-income, moderate-income, and
minority households over the last decade. I have also demonstrated that
CRA’s costs have been exaggerated. I have explained why a wide range of
other critiques of CRA miss the mark. Furthermore, comparing different
modes of credit market regulation and subsidy has helped to reveal some
hidden strengths and weaknesses of CRA, and to rebut the contention of
CRA’s critics that CRA should be abandoned in favor of various existing and
potential alternatives. In light of these assessments, I have suggested areas of
reform that would help CRA continue to expand access to capital. My
conclusions have been based on recent empirical studies, but I recognize that
as credit markets develop, scholars and policy makers should reassess CRA.

